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I.

INTRODUCTION
How would a wealth maximizing absolute ruler
behave towards his constituents? He can confiscate all
their wealth, but such a once-and-for-all accumulation is
inconsistent with maximization over time. . . . He can get
more income by promising to let constituents keep a
portion of their incremental output. However the ruler
continually faces a tradeoff between the higher income he
can obtain by relaxing restrictions on constituents (thereby
increasing their productivity and both their and his income)
and the increasing threat to his security that the relaxed
restrictions entail because his subjects have both more
freedom of action and resources to overthrow him.
Equally the constituents face the dilemma that the ruler
may at some point renege on his promises and confiscate
the accumulated wealth of his constituents. It is at this
point that . . . credible commitment[s] enter the picture.1

Just as the rule of the game will determine how well a ruler may
maximize his wealth, North's fable demonstrates that institutions or
institutional constraints are the determinant of economic performance.
Institutions, particularly political and legal institutions, may improve
economic performance by reducing uncertainty and establishing a stable
structure within which political and economic players interact, a process we
call "making institutional commitments credible." 2 Since, from the
1

Douglass C. North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, 149 J. INST. THEO. ECON. 11, 17
(1993).
2

DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE,
PERFORMANCE 5-6 (1990).
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constituents' standpoint, the key to credibility is how well the ruler will
honor his promise not to confiscate their accumulated wealth, the
enforcement of property rights is therefore central to credible commitment.3
China's economic performance since 1978 has been nothing but
spectacular, especially compared to that of the former Soviet Union or
those of the formerly socialist economies in Eastern Europe. When Deng
Xiaoping, the then paramount leader of China, launched the economic
reform by announcing "let some people get rich first,"4 he was less certain
about the how-tos other than to "cross the river by groping for stepping
stones."5 Three decades later, Deng's reform has been lauded by some as
having engineered the monumental transformation of one-fifth of
humanity6 and praised by others, who are awestruck by China's prescient
determination not to follow advice from neo-liberal economic theorists, as
a successful example of adopting a "homegrown" gradualist approach.7
Thus, it is clear that China's economic growth at break-neck speed has
brought enormous prosperity, wealth and pride to its people.
Yet, like the "wealth maximizing absolute ruler" in North's fable,
Deng was not immune to the threats to the political security of his partystate. When the student-led demonstrators poured into Tian'anmen Square
in the summer of 1989, without hesitation, he moved quickly to crush them.
Deng was not the first and certainly not the last in China's history to have
succeeded in fostering economic prosperity while tightly maintaining
sovereign supremacy. Such tradition may be traced back to the First
Emperor of Qin who proceeded to burn unorthodox books and bury
dissenting scholars promptly upon unifying China in 221 B.C., thereby
setting the foundation for standardized political and economic systems of a
dynastic China for the next two millennia. More than ten years have
passed since Deng's death in 1997 and much has changed in China. Yet,
much remains the same. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), once a
self-claimed revolutionary rebel, now clenches onto the two-millennia-old
authoritarian wisdom exemplified by the First Emperor and perfected by
Deng. To stay true to this tradition, the CCP remains steadfast in following
the blueprint envisioned by Deng: "Socialism with Chinese characteristics
3

North, supra note 1, at 17.
Weixing Chen, Has the Time Come for a New Ideology in China? The Creation of a New
Authoritative Discourse, 1998 CHINA REV. 259, 271.
5
RICHARD BAUM, BURYING MAO: CHINESE POLITICS IN THE AGE OF DENG XIAOPING 17
(1994).
6
David Shambaugh, Introduction: Assessing Deng Xiaoping's Legacy, in DENG XIAOPING,
PORTRAIT OF A CHINESE STATESMAN 1, 1 (David Shambaugh ed., 1995).
7
See e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 186 (2003) (stating
that "[o]ne attribute of the success cases is that they are 'homegrown,' designed by people
within each country, sensitive to the needs and concerns of their country. These and all
other successful transitioning countries were pragmatic - they never let ideology and simple
textbook models determine policy.").
4
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(有中国特色的社会主义)."8 Laden with vagueness and ambiguity, the
convenient phrase has been defined by the party-state to mean a full-scale
market economy coupled with the CCP's monopoly on political power, a
sermon not only preached but also practiced by the CCP. Economically,
China has been liberalized, but politically, it has stagnated under the one
party rule. Along with marketization came deepened social polarization
and stratification, mounting grievances among the poor and the weak, not
to mention rapid environmental degradation.
Setting aside the enormity of human costs, China seems to have
succeeded in its economic performance without undertaking the kind of
institutional rearrangements prescribed by the "liberal democratic"
development model - privatization and civil and political liberties as
preconditions for stable economic growth. For those who deem the moral
of North's fable sensible, three issues figure prominently: Firstly, did China
nonetheless achieve credible commitment in its institutional arrangements
without having to privatize its property rights? Secondly, depending on the
answer to the first question, will China ultimately privatize its property
rights, however gradually, in order to either achieve or, alternatively,
maintain the credibility to accommodate changes in its economy? Last but
not least, will China's economic marketization bring about civil and
political liberalization?
Confucius once said, rectification of names (正名) is a matter of
paramount importance in carrying an affair to success.9 The CCP may have
taken this advice to heart when it reaffirmed public property ownership
through the passing of its new property law in March 2007 (the "Property
Law"). After all, the Chinese translation of the "Communist Party" means
the "Party of Public Property Ownership." As such, deciphering the true
meaning and rectifying the name of "Socialism with Chinese
characteristics" may be the key to answering the three questions.
Originally a rhetorical slogan that reflected the collective ethos such as "old
things must be put to present use" and "foreign things must be put to
Chinese use" – the use of this term has been understood by many as having
a prescriptive value imposed by the CCP with its ideological pretense and
also a descriptive value reflecting what has taken place in China
empirically. Others, eschewing the Orwellian sentiment inevitably invoked
by it, wonder whether the phrase has a genuine normative value. Many
have written about China's de facto capitalism, brushing off the partystate's insistent socialist claim. Many more have speculated on how soon

8

RICHARD EVANS, DENG XIAOPING AND THE MAKING OF MODERN CHINA 252–53 (1994).
See THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS B. 13 V. 3 (James R. Ware trans., 1980) ("If names be
not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in
accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success[.] Therefore
[w]hat the superior man requires is just that in his words there may be nothing incorrect.").
9
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socialism will fully recede from China's social milieu. But perhaps in the
minds of many pragmatic Chinese, the question should no longer be "What
-ism does China practice?" A more apt question concerns what it means to
have "Chinese characteristics." If both "capitalism" and "socialism" are
well-defined and China's development model is genuinely sui generis, then
the features of this model would be embodied in what "Chinese
characteristics" come to represent. However, "[c]onsiderable haziness
surrounds"10 this term. Speculations abound that its ambiguity as well as
the institutions it represents may prove to be the wisdom of the CCP in
evading challenge, maximizing institutional flexibility and allowing trials
and errors.11 Could it mean the dual-track economic system under which
continued operation of the state sector was allowed while giving space to a
rapidly growing private sector? Or is it merely a codeword for Chinese
pragmatism as epitomized by Deng's proclamation that "it does not matter
if it is a white cat or a black cat, as long as it catches mice?”12
Against this backdrop, this paper intends to address the three issues
posed above, i.e., credible commitment, privatization of property rights,
and political liberalization, by analyzing China's legal institutional
arrangements of the most essential kind of property rights, real property
interests, within the institutional economics theoretical framework
proposed by North. Part II of this paper begins with a historical overview
of the real property systems that existed in dynastic China as influenced by
its cultural traditions. It follows with a chronicle of the major land use
policies and laws engineered by the CCP since 1949, including the
Household Responsibility System (包产到户承包制) ("HRS") initiated in
1978 and completed in 1982, which played a pivotal role in Deng's
economic reform, and the Property Law. Part III analyzes the interplay
between China's economic performance and the institution of property
rights. This part asks whether China's current property law system has
achieved credibility by decentralizing and fragmenting real property
interests, and concludes that it has. This part also ponders the question of
whether privatization of rural land ownership would benefit the next stage
of China's development. It finds that such privatization may not be the best
course of action, as the cost of doing so outweighs the benefits it promises
to offer. Part IV considers the practical implications that the current real
property law has on Chinese society, through land related grievances in

10

Steven N. S. Cheung, Will China Go "Capitalist"? An Economic Analysis of Property
Rights and Institutional Change, HOBART PAPER 21 (1982).
11
See id.; see also Peter Ho, Who Owns China's Land? Policies, Property Rights and
Deliberate Institutional Ambiguity, 166 CHINA Q. 394, 420 (2001) (concluding that China
deliberately implements ambiguous policies to reconcile Marx-Leninist principles with
privatization of land).
12
WILLIAM A. JOSEPH, Ideology and Chinese Politics, in POLITICS IN CHINA: AN
INTRODUCTION 129, 155 (William A. Joseph ed., 2010).
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both urban and rural settings. It questions whether the awakening of the
concept of property rights within its people, notwithstanding the partystate's tenacious grasp at the regime's legitimacy, will eventually lead to
political institutional change and help achieve democratization in China. It
ends on an optimistic note: "Hope is on the way," to borrow from recent
American politics. Palpable throughout this paper is an attempt to decipher
what "Socialism with Chinese characteristics" means within the context of
China's legal, economic and political development.
II.

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAND USE SYSTEMS IN CHINA

In River Elegy, a provocative TV documentary aired in China in
1988 which created the intellectual effervescence leading to the 1989
Tian'anmen student movement, Chinese civilization was called a landbased "Yellow Civilization," vis-à-vis the maritime-based "Azure
Civilizations" of the West. Despite its pervasive sensationalism, the
documentary rightly highlighted the indispensability of land, the most
significant asset of the mankind, in defining a person's existence in
traditional China and people's interactions with the state.
Institutions are "humanly devised constraints that shape human
interaction," according to North.13 There are two forms of constraints formal and informal. Formal constraints are "formal rules including
political (and judicial) rules, economic rules, and contracts;" and informal
constraints are, for instance, "codes of conduct, norms of behavior, and
conventions." 14 For this reason, my review of China's institutional
arrangements of property rights begins with a legal review and closes with
a cultural overview.
A. Property Rights and Land Use Systems in Traditional China
1. A Brief Legal Overview
Before China's unification by the First Emperor of Qin in 221 B.C.,
a feudal style system of land use distribution existed at least since the
Shang dynasty (16th C B.C. - 11th C B.C.), under which all the land was
owned by the king, the granted use rights were enjoyed by nobles, military
officers and public officials, and other people were serfs who passed with
the land.15 During the subsequent Western Zhou dynasty (11th C B.C. 770 B.C.), the land grant became transferable and the grantees became the

13

NORTH, supra note 2, at 3–4.
Id. at 36, 46.
15
PATRICK A. RANDOLPH JR. & LOU JIANBO, CHINESE REAL ESTATE LAW 1–2 (1999).
14
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de facto owners of the granted land.16 A land management system known
as the "well" system (井田制度)17 was developed in the Eastern Zhou
dynasty (770 B.C. - 221 B.C.), under which the entire parcel was owned de
facto by the grantee of the land but each of the eight surrounding outer
sections was allotted to an individual or a family to cultivate while the
center section, the communal section, was also cultivated by all eight
parties; in exchange, the parties could keep the proceeds or products from
their own sections while handing over the proceeds or products from the
center section to the de facto owner of the parcel.18
The quasi-private land ownership concept continued to develop
during the Eastern Zhou Dynasty and was conferred additional security by
the First Emperor of Qin, who issued an order requiring all peasants to
report their private land and recognized their ownership.19 Subsequent
dynasties also continued the practice of distinguishing state land, which
was owned by the Emperor and could not be transferred, from private land
of which free transferability was encouraged.20 The Song Dynasty (10th C
A.D.) developed a rough land registration system under which land
ownership was represented by a government issued certificate.21 After a
brief reversion to the feudal system during the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368)
under the Mongols, a comprehensive land survey system was established
by the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), together with the formalization of laws
concerning real estate ownership, transfer, and the concept of dian (典) (or
mortgage), which was first recognized during the Song Dynasty.22 The last
dynasty of China, the Qing Dynasty established by the Manchu, witnessed
a redistribution of large amounts of land to the Manchu people to the
detriment of the Han Chinese. However, to encourage agricultural
development, efforts were taken by the government to confirm the private
land ownership of the peasants.23
A brief interlude called the "Taiping Rebellion" is worth noting.
For more than ten years starting from 1851, significant regions of southern
China were controlled by a theocratic and militaristic regime known as the
"Taiping Kingdom," established through the Taiping Rebellion. 24 The

16

LAW SCHOOL TEXTBOOK SERIES: THE HISTORY OF CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM (法学系列教材：
中国法制史) 42 (1985).
17
The Chinese character for the word "well" is 井, representing the division of the land into
nine equal sections. Zhihou Xia, Well-Field System, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/639289/well-field-system (last visited Mar. 14,
2011).
18
RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 2.
19
THE HISTORY OF CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 16, at 96.
20
RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 4.
21
Id.
22
TEXTBOOK OF CHINA'S LEGAL HISTORY 233 (Ye Xiao Yin ed. 1989).
23
Id. at 249.
24
JOHN KING FAIRBANK, THE GREAT CHINESE REVOLUTION 1800-1985 81 (1986).
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regime abolished private land ownership, declared collective land
ownership by all people and allowed peasants who worked on the land the
right to use it.25 Some viewed the Taiping Rebellion an inspiration for Mao
Zedong in resorting to peasant uprising and revolutionary policies such as
communal land ownership.26
2. A Brief Cultural Overview
North believes that "culture defines the way individuals process
and utilize information and hence may affect the way informal constraints
get specified."27 Further, he emphasizes the important role played by the
long-run implication of the cultural processing of information in the
incremental way by which institutions evolve. 28 For that reason, he
identifies "culturally derived informal constraints" as a source of path
dependence.29
As William Alford notes, even though China's legal history goes
back to before the establishment of the Western Zhou Dynasty in the 12th
C B.C., as evidenced by the development of rules regarding civil matters
during the Zhou Dynasty, a code of conduct evolved from the concept of li
(礼) (or rites). Li, originating at least during the Western Zhou, became the
public rules governing the political, social and religious behaviors of the
pre-imperial society.30 Confucianism, relying on concepts such as li though
with lesser emphasis on religious rituals than before, was declared the
"supreme principle of government and moral conduct" in 140 B.C. by Han
Wu Di.31 It served as the cultural foundation for Chinese society and
shaped the "mentality and conduct of the Chinese, both individually and as
a collectivity."32 Law (法), on the other hand, originated from a secondary
philosophical school, Legalism, which was relegated to an instrumentality
by which the sovereign governed through punishing wrongdoings. 33
Despite the development of private law in traditional China, social and

25

RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 5-6.
PAUL A. COHEN, CHINA UNBOUND: EVOLVING PERSPECTIVES ON THE CHINESE PAST 212
(2003); see also Orville Schell, Unheavenly Kingdom, N.Y. TIMES, Feb, 4, 1996 (reviewing
JONATHAN D. SPENCE, GOD'S CHINESE SON: THE TAIPING HEAVENLY KINGDOM OF HONG
XIUQUAN (1996)).
27
NORTH, supra note 2, at 42.
28
Id. at 44-45.
29
Id.
30
William P. Alford, The Inscrutable Occidental? Implications of Roberto Unger's Uses
and Abuses of the Chinese Past, 64 TEX. L. REV. 915, 930 (1986).
31
ZHENGHUAN ZHOU, LIBERAL RIGHTS AND POLITICAL CULTURE: ENVISIONING DEMOCRACY
IN CHINA 140 (2005).
32
Id. at 166.
33
STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 15-16
(1999).
26
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economic relations were predominantly enforced through reliance on
informal norms based on social hierarchy.34 The informal norms and the
regime's public law system were not in opposition. Rather, the ideals
expressed in the social norms were more or less reflected in the public law
system and reliance upon public law did not obviate the need for such
norms.35 As Alford further observes, "[p]ublic, positive law was meant to
buttress, rather than supersede, the more desirable means of guiding society
and was to be resorted to only when these other means failed to elicit
appropriate behavior."36
Pierre Gourou marvels at the durability and effectiveness of the
institutional framework within which the traditional peasantries of the Far
East existed. 37 He remarks that, imbued with the Confucian moral
principles, the social framework "compris[ed] the family, the clan, the
village and the state." 38 He further notes that "[a] texture of local
institutions (that might be regarded as the 'weft') and a hierarchy of political
institutions belonging to the state (that could be looked on as the 'warp')
created a vast and durable woven framework that made [Chinese]
civilization particularly effective, in controlling vast numbers of people
spread over vast territories, for thousands of years." 39 Contrary to a
perhaps more popular view that traditional Chinese society was ruled by an
autocratic government with absolute authority, he believes, "the peasants
found in the traditional Chinese set-up some degree of protection against
despotism; [b]ecause the institutions were more powerful than individuals,
and the political framework depended on institutions rather than on the
whims of a king[.]" To prove his view, he points out that "serf-dom was
abolished in China long before it disappeared from Europe.”40
B. Property Rights and Land Use Law in Modern China
1.

Pre-1949

The 1911 Xinhai Revolution overthrew the imperial Qing and
founded the Republic of China (the "ROC"). Although, ideologically, the
ROC was founded upon Dr. Sun Yat-sen's "Three Principles of the People,"
in reality, the central government was unable to implement land reform or

34

PITMAN B. POTTER, THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: GLOBALIZATION AND LOCAL LEGAL
CULTURE 8-9 (2001).
35
WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 944 (1995).
36
Id. at 10.
37
PIERRE GOUROU, MAN AND LAND IN THE FAR EAST 145 (1975).
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
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wealth redistribution. Endless political and military turmoil between the
government, the warlords, the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) and the CCP
marked the early years of the ROC rule. China remained largely agrarian,
with most land in the countryside owned by landlords. Under the civil law
concept of yong dian quan (永佃权), the right to the surface of the land
belonged to the peasants while the basic ownership of the land, called tian
di quan (田地权), rights to the subsurface of the land, belonged to the
landlord.41 Under this system, the peasants actually enjoyed inheritable
rights to continue in possession so long as they paid their rent to the
landlord.42 In the countryside, most land was owned by landlords who
leased land to the peasants in exchange for rent, often in the form of crops
or other products rather than in cash.43 Land in the urban areas were
categorized as (1) leased land to foreign countries or individuals under the
so-called "unfair treaties," (2) public land owned by government agencies,
(3) land privately owned by various commercial entities including domestic
real estate companies, (4) land owned by other social entities, such as
religious societies, and (5) privately owned residential urban homestead
land.44
Despite disagreements among top authorities within the CCP, from
very early on, Mao Zedong realized the key to the CCP's success lay in the
peasantry.45 In 1921, to appease peasants and to maximize incentives for
the peasants, the CCP experimented with various land policies in areas it
controlled. Under the Land Law of the China Soviet Republic, adopted in
1931, all land was confiscated by the government except that owned by
poor peasants.46 In 1942, the Decisions on Land Policies were adopted,
which provided for private land ownership, presumably used to motivate
productivity by the peasants. Also, related legislative rules confirming
private ownership were issued, as were land ownership certificates. 47
Following victory in the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1945, the policy of
41

PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 351 (Zhang Jun Hao ed., 1991).
Id.
43
RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 8.
44
Id. at 7-8.
45
Mao Tse-tung, Report on an Investigation on Peasant Movement in Hunan, in SELECTED
WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 23 (1967). In March 1927, after conducting investigations in five
counties in Hunan Province, Mao Zedong wrote an article entitled "The Importance of the
Peasant Problem" where he urged that, "[a]ll talk directed against the peasant movement
must be speedily set right. All the wrong measures taken . . . concerning the peasant
movement must be speedily changed. Only thus can the future of the revolution be
benefited. For the present upsurge of the peasant movement is a colossal event. In a very
short time, in China's central, southern and northern provinces, several hundred million
peasants will rise like a mighty storm, like a hurricane, a force so swift and violent that no
power, however great, will be able to hold it back. . . Every revolutionary party and every
revolutionary comrade will be put to the test, to be accepted or rejected as they decide." Id.
46
RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 6.
47
Id. at 7.
42
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confiscating private land from landlords and redistributing the land to
peasants was resumed by the CCP. In the Shan-gan-ning liberated area, the
CCP negotiated to buy land from landlords for redistribution purposes and
paid the landlords with bonds.48 By reallocating the surplus previously
captured by the landlord class to peasants, the land reform created "a
population of independent cultivators with roughly equal small holdings."49
2. From 1949 to the 1978 Reform
Once the People's Republic of China (PRC) was founded, a
sweeping socialist transformation in China began in earnest until it was
abruptly halted by the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). In the early
1950s, the CCP aimed to establish the so-called Socialist Public Land
Ownership System by nationalizing the urban real property ownership and
simultaneously collectivizing rural land ownership. The PRC's first
constitution, adopted in 1954, embodied the fundamental principles of this
land ownership and redistribution system.50
In rural areas across China, the CCP expanded the scope of its very
successful land reform policies based on its experience of the two
preceding decades. 51 The rural population was then categorized into
various classes, and the landlord class was identified as the enemy of the
people and the revolution.52 The CCP continued its policy of confiscating
landlords' holdings and distributing them to the peasants through more
widespread and at times ruthless class struggle.53 As confirmed by the
Revised Draft of the Operational Regulations on Rural People's
Communes, promulgated in 1962, private ownership was completely
eliminated after the establishment of the cooperatives, even though
peasants continued to own their residential houses. 54 At first, the

48

TEXTBOOK OF CHINA'S LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 22, at 416.
MARK SELDEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHINESE DEVELOPMENT 69 (M.E. Sharpe, Inc.
1993).
50
Art. 4 of the 1954 Constitution declares that the PRC is set out to gradually eliminate the
system of exploitation and build a socialist society through socialist industrialization and
reformation. XIANFA art. 4 (1954) (China). The 1954 Constitution generally provides that
the state shall protect the ownership rights of peasants of rural land and allow a mixture of
ownerships over urban real properties. Id. The 1954 Constitution does not specifically
provide for ownership in land. Art. 8 provides that "[t]he state protects the right of peasants
to own land and other means of production according to law." XIANFA art. 8 (1954) (China).
It also provides that "[t]he policy of the state toward rich peasant economy is to restrict and
gradually eliminate it." Id.
51
SELDEN, supra note 49, at 57.
52
Benjamin James, Expanding the Gap: How the Rural Property System Exacerbates
China's Urban-Rural Gap, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 459 (2007).
53
Many landlords were publicly attacked, punished and even executed during the struggle
and their surviving families were condemned as having "bad class” status. See id. at n.23.
54
See RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 16.
49
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collectivization of the land was greeted by the peasants with resistance as
they were used to working on their small lots. Encouraged by the increased
productivity, the CCP created lower-level agricultural producers'
cooperatives, with each cooperative consisting of approximately thirty-five
households whose members pooled land and farming tools.55 In 1956,
higher level cooperatives were created which averaged about 160
households per unit, and peasants were asked to give up their title to land as
well as to other means of production. 56 As of the end of 1956, the
percentage of higher-level cooperatives reached ninety percent.57 By 1958,
the CCP's ideological fervor to leap over the capitalism stage as predicted
by Marx pushed rural collectivization to an extreme through the Great Leap
Forward.58 As many as five thousand households were organized into one
giant commune in which all were required to contribute according to the
best of his or her ability and receive food and other necessities of life in
exchange.59 The resulting famine caused by the CCP's disastrous mismanagement led to the death of over thirty million people from 1959 to
1961. 60 Blame for the failure divided the CCP's top leadership and
criticisms against Mao Zedong propelled him to launch the Cultural
Revolution in early 1966.
Upon occupying urban areas in 1949, the CCP moved to transform
the urban real property ownership through confiscation, conversion and
compulsory acquisition. Since all available resources were needed to
reconstruct and govern the urban economy, care was given to allow a
mixed ownership.61 The CCP's policy at that time was to abolish the
system of exploitation.62 Consequently, urban real estate holdings owned
by the so-called "bureaucratic capitalists, war criminals, traitors, and
counter-revolutionaries" were confiscated in accordance with the
"Instructions on Confiscating the Property of War Criminals, Traitors,
Bureaucratic Capitalists and Counter-revolutionaries" and the "Provisions
on Confiscating the Property of Counter-revolutionary Criminals" that were

55

James, supra note 52, at 458.
Id.
57
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promulgated in January 1951.63 A more gradual and gentler system was
utilized to convert the real estate owned by the urban national bourgeoisie
or urban capitalist companies.
The system enabled compulsory
government acquisition of the shares of former capitalist owners in their
businesses, including real estate interests through a policy known as "StatePrivate Joint Management of Private Businesses."64 The confiscated or
converted property interests were allocated to state-operated enterprises,
government agencies, public societies and urban laborers.65 In 1956, the
CCP issued the "Opinions on the Current Situation of Urban Private-owned
Buildings and Their Socialist Transformation," which helped achieve
nationalization of all real property owned by private real estate agents or
urban real estate proprietors.66 In 1964, two reports were promulgated by
the State Council to confirm the socialist transformation of the privatelyowned real property in cities and towns.67 Private ownership of urban
residential properties of urban citizens remained until 1982, when the
second Constitution was adopted, which pronounced state ownership of all
"urban land."68
The early land reform efforts by the CCP were short-lived. As the
nation swirled into the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, many privatelyowned houses in the cities were illegally confiscated or seized and state or
collectively owned houses were forcefully occupied or illegally
destroyed.69 In the meantime, more than seventeen million urban youth,
approximately one tenth of the urban population at the time, were sent
down to the countryside and became members of the communes. 70
Collectivization was sustained throughout the rural areas during the
Cultural Revolution, with the exception of the sporadic revival of private
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lots following the famine of the early 1960s and the subsequent
abolishment of such revival in many regions.71
3. The Era of Deng's Economic Reform
Soon after the ending of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, Deng
Xiaoping became the de facto paramount leader of China. A set of reform
policies ensued in 1978. In China's vast rural areas, encouraged by the
successful outcomes of regional experiments, the CCP reinstated the
Household Responsibility System (HRS).72 The HRS proved the "ultimate
solution in reconciling the Chinese state's ideological premises – state and
collective ownership of the means of production – with the bare necessity
of having to revive the agricultural sector dampened by years of
collectivism."73 Under the HRS, individual households, the most basic
social unit throughout traditional Chinese society and in rural China to
date, could enter into contracts with the collective to obtain the right to
farm certain amount of land, in exchange for a certain portion of the
produce.74 The term of the contract was initially for three years and was
extended to fifteen years in 1984 to induce more investment from peasant
households into the land.75 During the term of the contract, the right to the
land was made inheritable.76 The success of the HRS lay in its aim to
stimulate peasants' incentives, the lack thereof having been the chief vice of
collectivization. As Peter Ho points out, even though decentralization
under the HRS led to an extreme fragmentation of land resources and its
management, the introduction of the HRS certainly increased agricultural
productivity in China, at least initially.77 The increased rural productivity
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also fostered the emergence of the so-called town and village enterprises
("TVEs") which had become the backbone of China's economic miracle
during the reform era. By the early 1990s, the number of the TVEs
exceeded one million across rural China, accounting for nearly one-fourth
of the nation's industrial employment.78
Ideologically, the CCP was steadfast in maintaining the state and
collective land ownership. In 1982, a new constitution was enacted to
reaffirm this principle. Article 6 of the 1982 Constitution provides that:
"The basis of the socialist economic system of the People's Republic of
China is socialist public ownership of the means of production, namely,
ownership by the whole people and collective ownership by the working
people." Article 10 clarifies that: "Land in the rural and suburban areas is
owned by collectives except for those portions which belong to the state in
accordance with the law; house sites and private plots of cropland and hilly
land are also owned by collectives. The state may in the public interest
take over land for its use in accordance with the law. No organization or
individual may appropriate, buy, sell or lease land, or unlawfully transfer
land in other ways. All organizations and individuals who use land must
make rational use of the land." Similarly, the National People's Congress
("NPC") issued China's first Land Administration Law (土地管理法) in
1984, which became effective in 1987. 79 The law proclaimed that
"collective land is collectively owned by the peasants of the village and is
managed and administered either by rural collective economic organization
such as the village agricultural producers' collectives (村农业生产合作社)
or by villagers' committee (村民委员会)."80
While emphasizing the collective notion of the rural land
ownership, the CCP was also mindful of maintaining the individual
incentives created by the HRS and the increasing insecurity felt by the rural
households as the fifteen year contract term stipulated in 1984 was soon to
expire. As Scott Rozelle, et al., point out, the sagging productivity
experienced by the farm economy from 1985 to 1994 was due to the
weaknesses in the institutional arrangements, which had called for either
land privatization or for extending land contracts to thirty years or more.81
In 1997, the Secretariat of the CCP and the State Council issued a directive

in China: Facts, Fictions and Issues, DEVELOPMENTAL DILEMMAS: LAND REFORM AND
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that prescribed a stable lease period free from allocations for thirty years.82
This principle was embodied in the Revised Land Administration Law of
1998.83 In Rural China, the HRS has proven successful, as it effectively
motivated rural productivity without causing misuse of land resources,
while rallying widespread social support from the rural populace.84
The Law on Rural Land Contracting was adopted in 2002 to clarify
the operational system and the technical details of rural land contracting. It
states that the "two-tier management system" combines "centralized and
decentralized management on the basis of household contractual
management."85 It also stipulates the rights and obligations of the parties
under the contract.86 While offering protection to the long-term stability of
the relationships of the contracting of rural land, 87 the law also made it
clear that the nature of the contract is a lease, not a sale or purchase, and
that ownership of the land belongs to the collective.88 The law made it
easier for farmers to transfer their contract rights as long as the land use
remained for agricultural purposes.
In addition to the so-called "responsibility land" (责任田), there are
four other major types of land tenures existing in China's rural areas: ration
land ( 口 粮 田 ), contract land ( 承 包 田 ), private plots ( 自 留 地 ) and
reclaimed land (开荒田).89 Responsibility land describes land allocated to
farm households on the basis of the number of family members, the number
of laborers in each family, or desire and/or ability of the household to
engage in agricultural production. In exchange for use rights, farmers must
deliver a mandatory quota to the state as a price below-market.90 Ration
land is land allocated to farm households typically on the basis of
household size for the purpose of ensuring that each household is selfsufficient in producing grain, the use of which does not typically incur fees
or other obligations.91 Private plots are parcels of land acquired by the rural
household during the period of collective agriculture and retained with the
implementation of HRS. Today this is mainly the land in courtyards, and
not the private plot under collective times, since in many villages private
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plots are now collectively cultivated. Households enjoy almost complete
control over short- and long-term management of such plots with the
exception of the right of title transfer.92 Contract land is land contracted out
to households by the villages for a fixed fee. Village leaders may set fees
on these plots ex ante or farmers may have to bid on the land at a
community auction.93 Lastly, reclaimed land is land to which farmers
acquire use rights through efforts to reclaim previously uncultivated land.
For such land, there are not usually obligatory deliveries or fees tied to the
use of the land. 94 Although tenure types are not uniform throughout
China's villages, a 1992 survey by the State Statistical Bureau demonstrates
that responsibility land covered 84.5 percent of cultivated land, ration land
made up only 8.4 percent and, nationwide, farmers only cultivated 6.2
percent of their land as private plots.95
As reiterated in the 1982 Constitution, "[l]and in the cities is owned
by the state." 96 As a result, the Chinese government has not only
consistently prohibited sale of state owned land, but has also been
extremely cautious about avoiding the use of terms such as “sale” or
“lease”. 97 The Land Administration Law stipulates that "the State
exercises, according to the law, a system of valued use of state-owned
land."98 As the owner of all state land, the government keeps strict control
over land transaction through a two-tier urban land market system: On the
first-level market (一级市场) the state assigns the use rights of urban stateowned land to buyers for a fixed period varying from forty to sixty years
through auction, tender or negotiation; on the second-level market (二级市
场) land users can transfer (转让) or contract (承包) the use rights obtained
on the first-level market to other users in return for payment.99 The period
for the transfer cannot exceed the original term stipulated by the first-level
market.100
In 1986, the NPC adopted the General Principles of Civil Law to
reinforce China's civil law tradition and the principles set forth in the
Constitution.101 The G.P.C.L. defines "property ownership" as "the owner's
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rights to lawfully possess, utilize, profit from and dispose of his
property" 102 and prescribes that, unless otherwise stipulated by law or
agreed by the parties, "the ownership of property obtained by contract or by
other lawful means shall be transferred simultaneously with the property
itself."103 It further states that "state property shall be owned by the whole
people"104 and that "property of collective organizations of the working
masses shall be owned by the working masses."105 As Donald Clarke notes,
the G.P.C.L. provided the basic principles for the operation of a market
economy by "presuppos[ing] a universe of individual actors making
decisions based upon free will - the antithesis of the universe of the planned
economy[,]" but it fell short in providing for detailed rules.106
The 1982 Constitution was amended in 1988 to incorporate the
"transferable granted land use right,"107 which was essentially a codification
of what was taking place in practice. Shenzhen began this practice by
selling transferable land use rights on state owned land in 1987 and was
soon followed by other major cities, such as Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Xiamen
and Shanghai.108 Local legislation was adopted to allow sale of the granted
land use rights.109 After the constitutional amendment in 1988 to validate
this practice, corresponding language was added to the Land
Administration Law amended in the same year, together with interim
provisions addressing the creation and transfer of granted land use rights on
urban land.110 These legislative actions heralded the coming of a booming
urban real estate market in China. Newly granted land use rights were
created for office buildings, luxury hotels and shopping centers, even
though much of the development occurred without significant mortgage
financing.111 In 1992, the NPC adopted "Decisions on Establishing the
Socialist Market Economy System," further signaling the CCP's ideological
green light to develop the market economy.112 With the CCP's assurance,
governments at various levels competed amongst themselves in
establishing the areas in which the acquisition of transferable granted land
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use rights for development purposes were encouraged.113 To cool the overheated real estate market, the 1994 Urban Real Estate Administration Law
imposed clear and strict requirements for planning prior to release of land
for development and a much tighter control of public giveaways of land use
rights by regulating the system for pricing those rights.114 To exert tighter
control over land use management and halt land speculation, the State
Council General Office issued a circular in 1999 which imposed ceilings on
permissible construction in cities, villages and townships.115
China's urban housing system has also undergone a significant
transformation. Most city dwellers were employed by various state owned
enterprises (SOEs) or government agencies and thus, as social welfare
benefits, were provided with dorm-like apartment units by their work units
or the government, for virtually no rent.116 As of 1983, public housing
constituted 88.44 percent of total urban housing at the time.117 As a result,
there was virtually no incentive among the city populace to invest in
housing and few granted land use rights for housing were issued.118 Along
with the emergence of the private sector and the dwindling of the SOEs in
cities,119 China embarked on a reform to end the city housing welfare
system.120 Under the reform system, working units no longer distributed
public housing to their employees. Instead, public housing that was
previously distributed were sold or rented to existing residents with
increased rents in the latter situation, and newly built houses were sold to
city dwellers.121 State employees were allowed to buy their own homes
with the aid of subsidies (the amount of which was determined by their
seniority), public housing reserve funds, bank loans, and their own
savings.122 In 1995, the Security Law was passed which allowed real estate
improvements to be used as mortgage collateral.123 In 1999, the Ministry of
Construction issued the "Interim Measures Governing the Resale of
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Housing Purchased from Working Units and the Resale of Economic,
Appropriate Housing," which authorized the resale of housing purchased
from work units and of other housing purchased at subsidized prices.124
Notably, the absence of a healthy home mortgage financing system served
as a significant impediment for a speedy growth of China's housing market.
Such notwithstanding, by April 2000, the government reported that more
than half of all urban residents own their own home and 75 percent of these
had acquired their home in the preceding five years.125 As of early 2007,
70 to 80 percent of housing is privately owned in Shanghai and other
coastal cities.126
In December 2001, more than fifteen years after China had begun
the process to resume its status as a GATT contracting party, China joined
the World Trade Organization (WTO). Although China's commitment to
conform its laws and regulations to WTO standards and to improve its legal
system did not directly entail amendments of existing laws and regulations
relating to land use and real property rights, the principles of transparency
and uniformity applied.127 In 2004, the Constitution was further amended
to encourage and provide protection for private property rights,128 paving
the way for the passing of the Property Law.
4.

The Property Law of 2007

a.

The Legislative Process

On October 1, 2007, the much-awaited Property Law became
effective after a painstaking drafting process. The law was first drafted in
1993 and first reviewed by the Standing Committee of the NPC ("NPCSC")
almost ten years later in 2002.129 In an unusual move, the NPC made the
draft, considered by many as the "most contentious bill" in PRC's legal
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history,130 available to the general public and solicited public comments in
July 2005. 131 During a forty-five day public consultation or "citizen
legislation," the comments collected from the general public were more
than ten thousand and there were more than one hundred seminars and
discussion meetings conducted in order to gather comments from the
general public, legal scholars and government agencies.132 The draft was
greeted with heated debates among scholars, party officials and the general
public, representing the ideological struggles within the country after three
decades of economic reform. Supporters of the law believed it would
protect people's private rights, stimulate their incentives to create wealth
and enhance social stability.133 Those who resisted centered their rhetoric
on sensitive political and social issues such as worsening corruption,
siphoning of state assets and the growing disparity between the rich and the
poor.134 The most vocal opposition came from left-leaning scholars who
denounced the draft as "unconstitutional" and accused it as a deceitful
"betrayal of socialist principles" in an attempt to "cater to the trend of
capitalist globalization and absurd theories of neo-liberal economics."135
Oppositions notwithstanding, the law was eventually passed in March 2007
with much compromise after seven drafts.136
b.

Major Features of the Law

The 247-article law intends to codify a more expansive notion of
the property law, by consolidating and updating the pre-existing legal
system of property rights established over the last two decades, which
consists of the G.P.C.L., the Land Administration Law, the Urban Real
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Estate Administration Law, the Law on Rural Land Contracting, and the
Security Law. While the Property Law covers both immovable and
movable property, only the immovable (real) property aspect of the law
will be addressed here.
Hailed as a "landmark private property measure,"137 the Property
Law covers three categories of property rights: Ownership (所有权) (Part
Two), Usufructuary (用益物权) (Part Three) and Security (担保物权) (Part
Four). Ownership means "the right to possess, use, seek profits from and
dispose of the property."138 For the first time in PRC's history, the principle
of equal protection is extended to private property, in addition to property
owned by the state and collectives.139 In a legislative interpretation issued
by the NPCSC, the emphasis was on the civil law nature of the Property
Law and, therefore, the civil law principle that the rights of the rightholders shall be protected equally. 140 In addition to the three wellestablished ownership rights, i.e., state, collective and private ownership,
Part Two of the Property Law deals with additional types of real property
ownership rights. Chapter VI concerns owners' partitioned ownership of
building areas, recognizing the growing importance of the ownership rights
of urban dwellers who own apartment units for residential or business
purposes. Such ownership includes ownership over the exclusive parts
within the buildings, common ownership and the right of common
management over the common parts other than the exclusive parts.
Chapter VII relates to the relationship between adjacent property owners,
which includes rights to water, drainage, passage, air, and light from the
owner of an adjacent property. Chapter VIII regulates common ownership,
which includes several co-ownership and joint ownership. Article 42 of the
law provides that, "where houses and other real properties of entities and
individuals are expropriated, compensation for demolition and resettlement
shall be paid according to law in order to maintain the legal rights and
interests of those whose properties were expropriated; where individual
residences are expropriated, the residential conditions of those whose
residences were expropriated shall be guaranteed."
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Expanding on and further refining a civil law concept that was first
used in the G.P.C.L., Part III of the Property Law concerns usufructuary
rights.141 A usufructuary right is defined as "the right to possess, use and
seek proceeds from the real property [] owned by someone else in
accordance with law."142 It allows individuals and other legal persons to
use the land and other natural resources owned by the state and the
collectives. 143 Usufructuary rights include right to the contracted
management of land (土地承包经营权) (Chapter XI), construction land
use right (建设用地使用权) (Chapter XII), right to use house sites (宅基地
使用权) (Chapter XIII) and easement (地役权) (Chapter XIV). With
regard to the right to contracted management of land, it reinforces the two
tier management system “characterized by the combination of centralized
operation with decentralized operation on the basis of household contracted
management" in rural areas.144 It provides that the term of a contract for
cultivated land shall be 30 years and that the holder of such right may
renew the term of the contract in accordance with relevant regulations upon
the expiration of the original term.145 More important, it allows the holder
of such right to assign, exchange or transfer the right provided such
transaction is not for non-agricultural use.146 To further protect the holder's
right, the law prohibits agricultural collectives from readjusting the
contracted land or taking back the contracted land during the term of the
contract, and requires corresponding compensation paid to the holder of
such right in the event that a contracted land is expropriated. 147 The
Property Law does not allow agricultural collectives to sell their land or to
create granted land use rights. The intent is to reinforce the legal
restrictions on the conversion of arable land to non-agricultural use. As to
the right to use construction land, the law differentiates the right separately
established on the surface of or above or under the land,148 regulates the
creation, transfer, use and mortgage of the right,149 and allows automatic
renewal of the right to use dwelling houses upon the expiration of its initial

141

This concept was first introduced in Articles 80 and 81 of the G.P.C.L. to address the
right to use state- and collective-owned land, but without a systemic construction of this
type of rights. See G.P.C.L., arts. 80 & 81 (China).
142
Property Law, supra note 138, art. 117.
143
See id. ch. 10, General Provisions of Part III.
144
Id. art. 124. Benjamin James notes one highly symbolic change made by the Property
Law in the term it uses to identify contracting farmers. Unlike the Rural Contracting Law,
where it calls the contracting farmers "the contracting-undertaking party" (承包方), the
property law uses a more respectful phrase, "holder of the right to operate the contracted
land" (土地承包经营权人). See James, supra note 52, at 474.
145
Property Law, supra note 138, art. 126.
146
Id. art. 128.
147
Id. arts. 130–32.
148
Id. art. 136.
149
Id. arts. 137–48.

66

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

term, which is currently 70 years.150 More specifically, it allows automatic
extension of land use rights for residential construction.
The third category under the Property Law is property rights for
security. Part IV of the law amends, supplements and updates the Security
Law with respect to provisions on security interests, and includes the
general principles and provisions on mortgage (抵押权), pledge (质权) and
lien （ 留置权).151 It further improves the system of property rights for
security, extends the scope of collaterals, and revises the rules for the
realization of security rights. By amending relevant provisions of the
Security Law, Part IV of the Property Law offers more protections to a
mortgagee. Article 195 permits a mortgagee to request a court to auction
or sell off the collateral if there is a disagreement between the mortgagee
and the mortgagor with respect to the method of realization of the
mortgage. As a result, the transaction cost for a mortgagee's realization of
the mortgage will be foreseeably reduced.
The law adopts a uniform real property registration system in
Chapter II. Article 9 requires registration for the creation, change, transfer
or elimination of the right to real property to be effective.152 Registration is
carried out by the registration organ of the place where the realty is located
and the realty ownership certificate is the proof of the holder's
ownership.153 Article 20 allows advanced notice registration to protect the
rights of a party under a purchase agreement on a real property by requiring
consent of the holder in the advanced notice registration before the subject
real property may be disposed of. Article 21 allows compensation for
damages occurring as a result of fraudulent registration.
c.

Assessment of the Law

Lauded as a milestone in China's legal development, the Property
Law streamlined and consolidated the fragmented real property and land
use law into a single comprehensive legal framework. By officially
recognizing private ownership in certain real property interests and offering
equal protection to such ownership, it signals the CCP's determination to
push the nation forward on the path toward a market economy. By aiming
to enhance the much needed clarity and stability of property rights in
China, it gives confidence to the real property market, which will continue
to generate real estate developments in urban and suburban areas. Its true
genius, however, lies in its ability to achieve these goals without
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fundamentally challenging the socialist regime. Consistent with the CCP's
ideological rhetoric, the "private ownership" recognized under the Property
Law differs from the "fee simple" concept in the common law tradition as it
does not connote absolute private land ownership. Rather, it is a type of
nonexclusive ownership with less pervasive qualifications, i.e., usufruct.
This gradual innovation allows private actors to use the land under certain
conditions and for certain purposes while maintaining the constitutional
mandate that land belongs to the state or collectives.154 The system before
the new law was fragmented, ambiguous, inconsistent and lacking
uniformity, especially in the areas of ownership rights, land use rights,
mortgage regulations, and the title registration process. The new law aims
to correct those shortcomings by offering stronger protection of ownership
rights, allowing renewal of land use rights, broadening the parameters of
mortgage regulations, and adopting a uniformed registration process.
However, since it is a product of political compromise, the
Property Law is far from perfect. Lengthy paragraphs affirming the
supremacy of the "socialist system" and "state ownership" were added in
the law, as a concession to the leftist critics who opposed private
ownership.155 From the standpoint of defining land tenure, the law fails to
specify, among the three levels of a rural collective, the title holder of rural
land, which will not hamper the rampant problem of land expropriation in
rural areas. 156 The law does not limit the government's powers to
appropriate land,157 nor does it address historical land claims that predate
the land reform of the early 1950s.158 On an operational level, like most
other legislation in China, the law leaves the details of implementation to
future laws or regulations, which will likely cause serious enforcement
problems. Setting aside the disturbing reality that local governments often
deviate from enforcing standardized laws and regulations issued by the
central government and even assuming the provisions of the law will be
faithfully followed, the ambiguity of the law will result in differing
interpretations and applications. This will in turn intensify the lack of
uniformity in its application across the country. Another major problem
relates to the renewal of land use rights. Even though the law allows
automatic renewal of the right to use construction land for residential
purposes, it does not stipulate a specific period for the right but leaves it to
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regulation by other appropriate governmental agencies.159 Further, it is
unclear how the renewal process will be carried out, whether it will be
subject to any conditions or whether a fee will be charged. There is
speculation that local and regional governments will have the power to
exact additional payments at the time of renewal applications.160 The law
allows the renewal of the use rights of nonresidential properties but details
of the renewal are left to other legislation.161
The same uncertainty applies to the provision permitting the
automatic renewal of the right to use contracted management land in the
rural areas. Under the new law, farmers still cannot sell or mortgage their
plots, which will continue to prevent them from enjoying the fruits of the
market economy.162 For these reasons, many do not believe the Property
Law will likely bring about radical change in the way real estate
transactions are handled in China, even though the effectiveness of the law
remains to be seen.
Despite the above-mentioned ideological, jurisprudential and
technical constraints, China's real property law regime, as codified by the
Property Law, will have long-term, broad ramifications for Chinese
society. Is this mosaic-like system of land ownership and use rights
capable of ensuring the certainty and predictability essential to real estate
transfer and development? Are the institutional arrangements of property
rights under this system perceived credible by economic players in China?
Will the sense of ownership enjoyed by a burgeoning urban middle class
awaken an enhanced feeling of individual autonomy? Or will it be an
adhesive unifying the beneficiaries of economic reform and the current
political regime, thereby perpetuating the unequal distribution of social
wealth? Is the law capable of protecting farmers in the impoverished
countryside, who have long been left behind by the economic reform, from
losing their farmland to corrupt local officials seeking lucrative land sales?
Will the central government eventually be pressured to allow full private
ownership rights over the land? These issues will be discussed and
analyzed in Parts III and IV below.
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CAPITALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: THE
INTERPLAY BETWEEN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND
INSTITUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

Observers of China's economic reform and legal reform have been
quick to point out China's significant departure from the path delineated by
the neo-liberal theorists of the law and development school, as exemplified
by those advocated by the Washington Consensus. The theoretical
framework for the Washington Consensus mainly consists of the new
institutional economics ("NIE") influenced by, on the one hand, Ronald
Coase's "transaction cost economics" and Douglass North's designation of
law as an "institution," and on the other the "public choice economics"
which harbors a fundamental distrust of state interference into economic
affairs. 163
The neo-liberal rule of law proposed by the Washington
Consensus was a response to the needs for systemic reform presented by
the transitional socialist legal systems in the 1990s. The Washington
Consensus views clear and enforceable private property rights as the
precondition for stable economic development and well-functioning
markets. The Washington Consensus also recognizes that the need for
credibility and commitment within a market economy leads to the
formation of independent legal institutions.164
As evidenced by the policies and legal reforms undertaken through
the reform era set forth in Part II, China's "gradualist approach" differs in
two aspects from the so-called "big bang" method of privatization followed
by the former Soviet Union and most former socialist states in Eastern
Europe. First, in an attempt to move from a centrally planned economy to
a market economy, China did not engage in an outright privatization of its
real property rights. Second, China's substantial change in economic
institutions was not accompanied by a simultaneous political
transformation.165 The impressive economic growth that China has enjoyed
since the late 1970s seems to defy the need for privatization of land
ownership. Under the banner of a "Socialist market economy with Chinese
characteristics," China seems to have pioneered an alternative model of
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development that ensures long-term economic growth without abandoning
the principles of state and collective land ownership.166
Part III of this paper introduces the theoretical framework of the
credibility of property rights, which functions as the precondition to stable
economic performance. Part III then examines whether the particular
institutional arrangements of property rights in China have achieved
credibility, and therefore served as the driving force for the economic
growth despite a lack of outright privatization of ownership rights. Lastly,
in pondering the question of whether privatization of land ownership is in
order for the next stage of China's economic development, Part III
concludes that the cost of invoking full privatization may outweigh its
benefits. Thus, a better course of action is to rectify the current pitfalls of
the use and management of rural land, and to improve the credibility of the
use rights over such land.
A. Credibility of Property Rights
"Credibility" can be viewed as "a consequence of the stability of
individual expectations about future government actions to redefine or
violate relevant property rights."167 Just as the "constituents" in North's
fable face the dilemma that the "ruler" may at some point renege on his
promises, property right holders fear that their rights risk being infringed
upon by the very government who defined their rights. Therefore,
credibility of the commitment is the "fundamental question of property
rights."168 For a reform to be effective in promoting economic growth and
political stability, property rights must be credible. This section begins
with an investigation of the nature of property rights, including an analysis
of property rights in China, and then examines what makes property rights
credible.
1.

What are Property Rights?

When considering property or property rights, most people,
including legal professionals, intuitively construe such rights as ownership
rights, and view property as things that are owned by persons. This view
has its historic origin. William Blackstone famously proclaimed that the
right of property means "dominion" over things that "one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the
166
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right of any other individual in the universe,"169 although he later qualified
his claims of dominion with uncertainties over the origins of title. 170
However, as Charles Donahue, Jr. points out, both a historical review and a
comparative study easily show the extraordinary diversity in the concept of
property that has existed in the West as well as in non-Western societies.171
Such a finding makes it clear that "any concept of property other than the
definitional one" must be examined within the "culture in which it is
found."172
2. Property Rights in the Western Tradition: Common Law View
vs. Civil Law View
Let us examine property rights in the common law system first and
then turn to the civil law system. In the common law tradition, some
modern property theorists differentiate themselves from the Blackstonian
view by dissolving the notion of ownership.173 Wesley Hohfeld analyzes
the concept of property within the framework of jural relationships that
consist of the pairing of what he called "the lowest common denominators
of the law," namely, rights and duties, privileges and no-rights, powers and
liabilities, immunities and disabilities.174 He points out that as a fee-simple
owner of Blackacre, A's "'legal interest' or 'property' to the land consists of
a complex aggregate of rights (or claims), privileges, powers and
immunities," which include (1) A's multital legal rights, or claims, that
others shall not enter on the land or cause physical harm to the land; (2) A's
indefinite number of legal privileges of entering on the land, etc. within the
confines of law (correlative to A's legal privileges are the respective legal
no-rights of other persons); (3) A's legal power to alienate his legal interest
to another (correlative to all such legal powers are the legal liabilities in
other persons); and (4) A's indefinite number of legal immunities (nonliability or non-subjection to a power on the part of another person)
(correlative to the immunities are the respective legal disabilities of other
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persons in general).175 Thus, A's property rights relating to Blackacre lie in
these various elements.
Even though Hohfeld's jural relationships approach appears to be
the first attempt at the articulation of the common law "bundle-of-rights" or
"bundle-of-sticks" conception of property, 176 Donahue believes that the
Hohfeldian definition of property has universal application due to its
descriptive nature.177 The Restatement of Property adopts a Hohfeldian
definition of "property."178 It states that the word "property" is used to
"denote legal relations between persons with respect to a thing" and that
"[l]egal relations between persons can be of widely differing types,"
including "relations designated by the words 'right,' 'privilege,' 'power' and
'immunity.'"179 Therefore, in the common law tradition, the law of property
"deals with the complexity of those jural relationships with respect to
things, those things being normally tangible things, although in some legal
systems, those intangibles that the law somewhat arbitrarily classifies as
property are also included."180
Although the relational dimension of the concept of property rights
can indeed apply to both common law and civil law systems as suggested
by Donahue, the fragmentation of ownership approach adopted by the
common law system is certainly not a feature shared by the civil law
system. As a general rule, the civil law countries of Europe have followed
a "unitary theory of property rights" since the nineteenth century, under
which all property rights in an asset (both movable and non-movable
properties) must be concentrated in the hands of a single owner rather than
divided into partial rights shared among two or more persons."181 The
totality conception of ownership is emphasized in the civil law definition of
"property." As Alain Levasseur points out, in the Vocabulaire Juridique of
Professor Gérard Cornu, the civil law equivalent of Black's Law
Dictionary, "property," "used by itself, refers to the private ownership –
individual right of ownership – and the full ownership or the highest level
of a real right: to use, to enjoy and to dispose[.]"182 Therefore, Article 544
of the French Civil Code defines "ownership" as "the right to enjoy and
dispose of things in the most absolute manner, provided they are not used
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in a way prohibited by statutes or regulations[.]"183 Article 947 of the
Québec Civil Code offers a similar definition with the addition that
"[o]wnership may be in various modes and dismemberments." 184 In
describing the "substance of ownership" Article 903 of the German Civil
Code uses more absolute language and states "[t]he owner of a thing may,
to the extent that it is not contrary to the law or the rights of third parties,
deal with the thing as he pleases and exclude others from any
interference."185
Both civil law and common law systems recognize a limited
number of partial or divided property rights. In the common law system,
property rights for limited uses of land include, for example, easements,
real covenants, and equitable servitudes.186 In the civil law system, the
theory of numerus clausus (closed number) allows a relatively small
number of specifically defined exceptions to the "unitary theory of property
rights," and these "incidents of ownership (particularly with regard to real
property) are grouped into code-defined jura in re aliena (other real
property rights, including usufruct rights)."187 Civil law jurisdictions also
impose more rigid restrictions on such rights.188 Permissible exceptions
include, for example, cotenancy, servitudes on real property, mortgages on
real property. And partial property rights that do not conform to one of
these specific exceptions, such as private trust, are unenforceable.189 On
the other hand, although the condominium has long been recognized by the
civil law and widely employed in Europe, it was not accepted into U.S.
property law until 1961, and English law continues to decline its
adaptation.190
Despite the varying degrees of differences between the two legal
systems as illustrated above, they share similar philosophical
underpinnings. Based on a historical review of the concept of property in
both the Roman law tradition and English legal system, Donahue finds that
"one tendency seems to characterize the legal concept of property in the
definitional sense in the West: a tendency to agglomerate in a single legal
person, preferably the one currently possessed of the thing that is the object
of inquiry, the exclusive right to possess, privilege to use, and power to
convey the thing."191 Further, he concludes that the "Western legal concept
183
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of property has always been associated with various forms of
individualism," some of which lie behind the Roman concept of property
and others the emergence of property in English law. 192 Although
individualism is only one side of a dichotomy, namely individualism versus
communalism, the concept of property in the West has normally been
associated with the former only. 193 He urges that, given the tension
between both sides of the dichotomy, i.e., the individual and society, selfprotection and self-giving, the legal system must resolve the tension
between them.194
3. Locating China's Property Rights
A review of China's property rights systems, described in Part II,
against the theoretical framework of the Western conception of property
rights, summarized in Subpart A.1.a of Part III above, reveals that the
current property rights regime in the PRC is a unique product of two main
factors: (i) China's conscious, voluntarily or coerced, effort starting from
the end of the imperial era, to internationalize its overall legal system and
(ii) China’s recognition of its potent indigenous legal culture shaped by
path dependence. In other words, China’s property rights regime features a
collectivist legal order based on Confucianism, as influenced by continental
civil law system with an infusion of Marxist-Leninist ideology. As Potter
observes, the development of property rights in the PRC is a process of
mediating the conflicts between the individualist orientation of liberal
property rights regimes and the collectivist norms of Chinese tradition and
PRC policy. 195 He further points out that, "[t]he patrimonialism of
Confucianized Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought combines with
the sovereignty of party-state supremacy to establish a powerful modality
of governance in the PRC."196 If indeed that was the end that the party-state
tries to achieve, then the means to accomplish that end is to import legal
forms from Europe, the former Soviet Union, and increasingly from North
America, through a process called "selective adaptation."197
The authoritarian and hierarchical principles of Confucianism,
which are deeply embedded in Chinese culture, dictated that the interests of
the individual should be subordinate to those of the collective. 198 The
collective was represented by community organizations, such as clans,
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guilds, and governments.199 Despite the existence of private property rights
described in Part II, the predominant feature of the property rights regime
in dynastic China was its collective tradition,200 which remains strong in
present day China. Notwithstanding the prevalent cultural influence, the
property rights regime of the PRC is distinctively molded by transplanted
civil law influences. The renowned Chinese jurist Shen Jiaben was
designated by Guangxu Emperor to supervise the drafting of a new civil
code, which was completed in 1911 but never officially promulgated due to
the collapse of the Qing Dynasty later that year.201 The draft Civil Code of
the Qing Dynasty (大清民律草案), which was modeled after the German
Civil Code and the Japanese Civil Code, in turn influenced the Civil Code
of the KMT government.202 Efforts to transplant legal institutions from the
West, mainly European countries, and Japan continued by the KMT
government without much success, as such attempts were inconsistent,
hasty and mechanical.203
Upon the CCP's takeover in 1949, China adopted a Soviet style
"command economy," featuring state and collective ownership of land and
other means of production, which was later abandoned in the late 1950s.204
In the civil law arena, the conception of ownership in the PRC has been
overwhelmingly influenced by Soviet civil law jurisprudence.205 Unlike the
European civil law tradition described above, the Soviet system gave
greater preference to the unitary nature and totality conception of
ownership.206 As Frank Huang observes, ownership under this system "was
understood as an indivisible and absolute whole and jura in re aliena was
not provided for."207 As reflected in the 1954 Constitution, all means of
production were publicly owned and centrally managed.
The economic reform and the accompanying legal reform begun in
late 1970s saw China's efforts to interpret and justify newly created
individual interests brought about by the decollectivization of property
rights and the creation of new individual property interests based on the old
narrow conception of ownership.208 It has been a challenging task to create
and maximize economic incentives to enhance institutional efficiency and
productivity without challenging the supremacy of party-state and the
public ownership. It was not until the early 1980s after the introduction of
199
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HRS that the Chinese legislature and legal scholars began formulating a
consistent and comprehensive real property rights theoretical framework.
Even then it was largely to justify and then codify what had been practiced
on the ground.
One of the central agendas of this task was to develop ownership
theories to formalize and streamline the decentralized lesser interests. Save
those rare instances where common law concepts, such as the doctrine of
"estate," were borrowed, the dominant view among legal scholars was to
use the civil law jurisprudential framework, as they were convinced that
"the Pandectist system of 'real property rights' (物权) is more appealing
because of its legal specificity, uniformity and publicity."209 The elaborate
use of the concept of "other real property rights" (他物权), particularly
"usufruct" (用益物权) is of critical importance in "propertizing" the
decentralized lesser interests, such as the "land use right" of state-owned,
mostly urban, lands, the "contractual management right" of collectively
owned rural lands, the "enterprise management right" of SOEs, and "profits
a prendre" of state-owned natural resources.210
Much of the legal scholarship leading up to and concurrent with the
drafting and implementation of the Property Law was about usufructuary
rights.211 For example, Fang Shaokun traces the historical origin of this
term to ancient Roman law, which consisted of diyi quan (地役权), renyi
quan (人役权), yongdian quan (永佃权) and dishang quan (地上权).212
He believes the concept of usufructuary rights contained both in the French
Civil Code and the German Civil Code was influenced by the ancient
Roman law.213 In an effort to prove that this concept was an integral part of
China's legal tradition, he notes that the practical contents of usufruct
existed in traditional China's dianquan (典权) system, such as diyi quan,
yongdian quan and dishang quan, even though no specific statutory
sections were singled out for this type of rights.214 Further, he observes that
usufructuary rights were classified into four categories, dishang quan,
yongdian quan, diyi quan and dianquan in the Second Draft of Civil Code
of Qing Dynasty (第二次民律草案), which classification was adopted by
the civil law principles of the PRC.215
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One of the lesser ideologically driven debates surrounding the draft
Property Law concerns whether to treat the rural land contracted
management rights as a species of contract rights or usufructuary rights.216
To better protect the interests of individual lessee villagers, stabilize the
economic relationship between the collective owners and individual users,
and enhance the transferability of the right, the Property Law adopted the
usufruct approach.217
4.

What Makes Property Rights Credible?

North tells the story of the "wealth maximizing absolute ruler" to
illustrate what makes a commitment credible.218 He offers two kinds of
credible commitments:
The ruler may be able to structure the game so that it is
both in his and his constituents' interest to abide by the
rules -- motivational credibility. Or the ruler may find that
further wealth accumulation can only be realized by
binding himself irreversibly (such as giving over rights and
coercive power to constituents or their representatives) -imperative credibility.219
He further elaborates that,
[a] commitment is motivationally credible if the players
continue to want to honor the commitment at the time of
performance. In this case it is incentive compatible and
hence self-enforcing. It is credible in the imperative sense
if the player cannot act otherwise because performance is
coerced or discretion is disabled.220
Subsequent law and development theorists, including those who
influenced the Washington Consensus, have focused on the "imperative
credibility" option, which deems a commitment credible only if such
commitment devices compel actors to abide by a set of rules because a
violation of such would have been too costly. Since "[i]nstitutions are the
rules of the game"221 and since legal systems are institutions,222 under the
"liberal democratic" development model they espoused, competitive
markets, free individuals, and civil and political liberties protected by "the
216
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rule of law" are critical preconditions to stable economic growth.223 Central
to this liberal democratic understanding is the privatization of property
rights, especially as applied to the formerly socialist economies. As
prescribed by Cheryl Gray, those economies must establish the institutions
of private market economy because “[s]ocialism either crippled or
reoriented these institutions to reflect the goals of central planners” and, as
a result, “[l]egal frameworks defining property rights, private contract
regimes . . . atrophied.”224
The popularity and widespread application of the policies
advocated by the Washington Consensus at that time largely overshadowed
North's motivational credibility option, which focuses on credibility
achieved through self-enforcing, not compelled, institutional constraints.
Under this option, credibility is self-enforced if players are incentivized to
honor the commitment at the time of their performance. Unlike orthodox
law and development theory, this analysis no longer simply insists that
privatization is the precondition to development, because the key inquiry is
shifted to whether the underlying institutional arrangements, including
property rights, can achieve sustained credibility by creating sufficient
incentives.
Propelled by sufficient incentives created by strategic interaction or
bargaining among political and economic actors, credible commitment to
property rights emerges as an equilibrium; and in equilibrium, the behavior
of political and economic agents is self-enforcing. 225 In other words,
property rights "are respected only if the relevant agents cannot improve
their payoff by violating them." 226 In a "dictatorial decision making"
setting, Daniel Diermeier et al. observe, the credibility of the property
rights depends on the strategic incentives facing the actors, for the
government it is the probability of its political survival, i.e., the likelihood
that the government will not be overthrown, and for the "producer" the
"equilibrium tax rate," under which his gains will not be expropriated by
the government with higher than expected "tax rates."227 It follows that
property rights are credible only if the expected benefits for the government
are high enough to make it worthwhile to forgo expropriation and if all
actors are able to observe a defection by the government. For there to be
an investment equilibrium, a partial or "noisy" observability of defections
will suffice.228
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By contrast, Diermeier et al. apply the same economic analysis to a
"stylized majority rule decision making" model under which the decision
makers come from different demographics and are driven by varied
incentives when voting for a tax rate.229 Diermeier et al. find that, by
reducing the influence of any individual political actor somewhat, the
credibility of property rights could be increased because the cost of
changing the "tax rate" increases. In other words, since decisions are made
by a majority through a democratic process, the incentive on the part of the
government to deviate will be decreased; as a result, property rights will be
more secure under this model than the dictatorial decision making model.230
Applying the same analysis to a "federalistic decision making" setting,
where authority and responsibility are allocated among different levels of a
hierarchy of autonomous governments, and to a "interest group decision
making" setting, Diermeier et al. conclude that, "[t]his logic suggests a
testable hypothesis: Other things being equal, governments with dispersed
political power are better able to make a credible commitment to property
rights than are governments with more concentrated power."231
B.

Are Property Rights in China Credible?

The legislative process in the area of real property law reflects the
general development approach adopted by the party-state elsewhere in the
reform, i.e., incremental transition rather than radical reform. Instead of
abandoning altogether the state and collective ownership of land and opting
for outright privatization, China utilized innovative lesser real property
interests, such as the "right to contracted management of land" in the
countryside and "construction land use right" in cities, which essentially
combined centralized ownership with decentralized use and management
rights. By doing so, China was able to establish a preliminary legal
framework in this area which functioned to stimulate growth in the rural
areas and real estate development in the urban areas.
But are property rights offered by the current system credible? As
observed by Diermeier et al., in a system where decisions are made by a
single actor, credibility of the property rights does not mean perfect
security, rather it rests on whether the commitment is capable of creating
sufficient incentives on both the government and the economic actors. In
other words, whether an observability of the government's defections has
induced sufficient incentive on the part of the government to honor its
commitment and whether such commitment is perceived by the economic
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actors to be sufficiently secure in order to create an incentive for them to
continue to invest.
Despite the lack of land tenure security, clarity or uniformity in
enforcement, the system has achieved "motivational credibility," to borrow
from North. This is accomplished by creating sufficient incentives in the
minds of China's economic actors, namely the farmers in rural areas and
real property investors and the general public in the cities with regard to
both commercial and residential real properties. There exists an incentive
on the part of the party-state to honor its decentralization commitment in
the real property law regime, arising from an observability by both the
party-state and the general public of a defection, i.e., the vanishing
legitimacy of the one-party rule resulted primarily from the gross mismanagement by the party both economically and politically since the
founding of the PRC. An incentive on the part of economic actors, on the
other hand, is created because they deem the commitment by the party-state
credible.
1.

Political Vulnerability of the Party-State

The disadvantaged, disenfranchised and the self-enlightened, in
spite of the government's suppression, managed to make their discontents
heard through political disobedience, such as the Tian'anmen student
movement in 1989 and the surging activism recently seen in land related
grievances.232 Deng's suppression of the Tian'anmen student movement
notwithstanding, the process of marketization resumed two years later.
Further, as mentioned in Part I above, the determination to push forward
for a system of Socialist market economy was reaffirmed in 1992.233 As
indicated in a television speech Deng gave in the immediate aftermath of
Tian'anmen, he called the political "turmoil" inevitable and said that "it was
[] independent of all human will."234 In the same speech, he stated that the
reform policies "ought to stand."235 It had become clear to Deng that
reform was not only inevitable but also the only salvation for the partystate's political survival. As Robert Weatherley observes, "[u]nable to
reconcile its Marxist ideology with the increasingly active role of the
market and unwilling to wholeheartedly embrace institutional and other
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political reforms, the party looked more and more to the economy as a
means of shoring up its popular appeal."236
Similarly, the process China took to draft and enact its Property
Law demonstrates the party-state's acute awareness of its political
vulnerability as exposed by the surging social activism and unrests relating
to land grievances. It is reported that rural land grievances have become
the major source of unrest in China 237 and that "property rights have
displaced tax burdens as the primary focus of peasant activism."238 The
unprecedented move for the NPC to seek public consultation on the draft
Property Law was propelled by its desire to test the public's expectations
about how much commitment from the party-state would make the rights
credible. The public consultation process, which involved seven drafts
over a period of thirteen years, is a vivid illustration of the bargaining
process between political and economic actors in achieving what North and
Diermeier et al. called an equilibrium, i.e., self-enforcing credibility
through motivation.239
2. Decentralization and Deliberate Non-Interference
Conversely, the commitment by the party-state to decentralize
property rights has created sufficient incentives for farmers and city
dwellers alike, both developers and residents, to invest in the lesser real
property interests. Much of the literature on China's legal system and legal
reform has pointed to considerable deficiencies, including ambiguity, lack
of clearly defined property rights and weak enforcement, and concluded
that China has not achieved "rule of law."240 Granted such may be the case,
but it was the same indeterminacy and institutional ambiguity that created
the incentives desperately needed to improve productivity which was
previously lacking for an economy to emerge from a centrally planned
model. As Peter Ho remarks, "this 'deliberate institutional ambiguity'
makes the system tick."241 Although, given the muddling-through and "trial
and error" characteristics of Deng's reform trajectory, Ho himself has
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qualified that the "deliberate" nature of the institutional ambiguity, the lack
of clearly defined property rights has indeed "provided flexibility and
fluidity that were needed for increasing productivity of the land." 242
To increase productivity through incentives was clearly a goal
Deng had in mind when he announced "let some people get rich first" in
1978 and launched the HRS shortly after. At the heart of Deng's legacy is
his unleashing of the largest labor force in the world by "allow[ing]
economic (but not political) developments to unfold without constant
interference from the Party or government."243 In other words, "he has
displayed a personal talent for laissez-faire: he has mastered the ruler's art
of non-acting." 244 The trademark feature of a centrally-planned economy is
the party-state's omnipresence at all levels of the economic structure. By
adopting a non-interference strategy, de facto deregulation became the key
to effecting the decollectivization and decentralization policy, which was
primarily responsible for HRS's resounding success in rural China.
If credibility is initially created by incentives, it is sustained by
trust. While articulateness can help build trust, trust may also be induced
by vagueness. When commenting on someone's work, Ronald Coase once
remarked: "Not being clear, it was never clearly wrong."245 In other words,
"[a]n idea which is not clearly stated can never be proved clearly wrong[,]"
since the advantage of vagueness is its ability to elude challenge.246 Some
argue that vagueness and ambiguity in the policies and laws of the PRC
may have helped the CCP in evading ideological challenges from its
supporters and non-supporters alike, at least during the initial phase of the
reform. Peter Ho observes that, since property rights, especially ownership
of such rights, touch upon the very foundations of the PRC, it is crucial for
the party-state to strike the right balance between ideology and socioeconomic reality, in order to avoid social conflict. 247 Therefore, land
policy-making is "an alternation of restraining practices that exceed legal
boundaries and giving space to experimentation by formulating
intentionally unclear policies and laws."248 He further observes, "[t]he
ambiguity results in a lot of confusion about the officially condoned land
property arrangements," but at the same time, it "allows a certain degree of
[local] experimentation."249
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Barry Weignast argues that China's reform policies had
inadvertently created what he called a system of "self-enforcing marketpreserving federalism."250 According to Weignast, the pragmatic approach
to the reform resulted in the decentralization of powers, including fiscal
authority. Such decentralization not only created incentives among local
governments for "preserving their newfound power, but [also] gave them
the fiscal resources and muscle to resist efforts by the central government
to undo the system." 251 In Peter Ho's view, the institutional ambiguity, as
supported by the party-state, has "not only served as the lubricant of a welloiled machine, but also prevented the large-scale eruption of land-related
grievances over ownership that ruptured transitional economies such as in
former socialist states in East Europe."252
In analyzing economic history through an institutional framework,
North warns that the powerful influence of the past on the present and
future should not be neglected. As he points out, "[l]earning of history [] is
an incremental process filtered by the culture of a society that determines
the perceived payoffs[.]" 253 The political turmoil and extreme volatility of
organized social unrest such as the Great Leap Forward and Cultural
Revolution during the Mao era had rendered a very low threshold for what
could be credible in measuring the expectations of the general public. The
structure of the centrally planned economy had by that time virtually
destroyed any incentive to improve productivity before the reform policy
was introduced. Against this historical backdrop, the relative social
stability of the Deng era and its decentralization measures are highly
conducive to creating strong incentives for the public. Conceivably,
credibility on the part of the economic actors was achieved with little
difficulty.
By achieving motivational credibility, property rights
arrangements in China during the reform era, however vague,
indeterminate or ambiguous, had fostered the nation's stellar economic
performance, while defying the policy guidelines proposed by the neoliberal economic theorists. In praising the incremental approach taken by
the Chinese government, Joseph Stiglitz remarks that: "The ultimate irony
is that many of the countries that have taken a more gradualist policy have
succeeded in making deeper reforms more rapidly." 254
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C. Legal Reform with Chinese Characteristics
As shown by China's recent legislation in the area of real property
rights, although it falls short in setting forth clearly defined ownership
rights, especially in the rural areas, and providing concrete enforcement
procedures, the Property Law nevertheless proves efficient. China's
experience in this area may have validated Richard Posner's view that "the
focus of [legal] reform [of poor countries] should be on creating
substantive and procedurally efficient rules of contract and property rather
than on creating a first-class judiciary[.]"255 A major rationale, according to
Posner, is that a poor country may benefit from making modest initial
expenditures on law reform, aimed to improve its rules of contract and
property, as a tradeoff because a small expenditure on law reform can
increase the rate of economic growth.256 Once the rate of economic growth
is increased and resources are generated, it will enable such country to
undertake more ambitious legal reforms in the future.257 Further, informal
substitutes for the formal legal system not only are less expensive but also
play a significant role in the enforcement and protection of property and
contract rights.258 Among the informal substitutes that Posner identifies,
the following prove particularly effective: Arbitration (with or without
legal enforcement of the arbitrator's award), reputation (which may be
accompanied by retaliation), and altruism (which enables many familyowned firms to operate effectively outside a legal framework). 259 In
Posner's view, China proves and embodies his theory.
Donald Clarke et al. echo Posner's view, albeit with less
conviction. Based on an examination of the relationship between law,
institutions, and property rights in post-Mao China, Clarke et al. conclude
that "the Chinese experience may show support for a theory that
development induces law."260 They begin their analysis by positing the socalled "China Conundrum" - the seeming contradiction between the China
experience and the Rights Hypothesis, which accords importance to a wellfunctioning legal system.261 After applying several theories, Clarke et al.
find that, "while contract institutions do affect some things[,] it is property
rights institutions that matter for investment and long-run economic
255
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growth."262 They conclude that, "the various shortcomings of China's legal
institutions insofar as they protect contract rights [vis-à-vis property rights]
may not matter very much, provided that the political structure in a
sufficient number of places provides a reasonable degree of certainty to
investors, both pubic and private."263
The CCP's conscious effort to maintain the legitimacy of its regime
has unconsciously stricken a chord with the belief held by Posner, as
discussed immediately above, and North, as stated elsewhere in this paper,
that informal institutions play a significant role in shaping the overall
institutional change and thereby impact economic performance.
Commenting on the importance of political commitment, Posner notes:
It should be obvious that effective legal reform depends
ultimately on a political will to reform, which in turn is
likely to depend on a political will to implement economic
reform. If the dominant political groups in society want
economic prosperity and are willing to risk the loss of
political control over the economy that modern economic
conditions dictate, they will also want legal reform. If they
do not want economic reform, the will to adopt legal
reform is likely to be absent.264
While it is true, as illustrated in Subpart III.B above, formal
institutional changes aimed at decentralization have been critical in
obtaining credibility of new property forms in the reform era, changes in
informal institutions have played a significant role in providing the
guarantee of nonintervention.265
One of the considerably more powerful, albeit informal,
institutions in the PRC is party policies of the CCP. As Yuanyuan Shen
points out, the CCP policy certainly enjoyed supremacy before Deng's
reform, due to the doctrine that "Party policy is the soul of socialist law."266
The early phase of the law reform starting from the late 1970s, signaled the
CCP's attempt to establish the authority of law. 267 However, despite legal
and political efforts at the time, "[i]n both theory and reality, [] it is
impossible to have a comprehensive and institutionalized legal system with
a high degree of authority when law is neither 'autonomous' nor 'supreme,'
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but used only as an instrument of [p]arty rule." 268 As Alford observes, this
instrumentality was reflected in "the willingness of states or individuals to
use legality as an instrument to achieve their policy objectives but to depart
from it when compliance with the law no longer serves the attainment of
such ends."269 For this reason, the ambiguity and vagueness in formal legal
institutions made it possible for the party-state to adeptly maneuver from
legality to party policy to respond to the emerging interests and rising
needs that resulted from unpredictable social changes. As demonstrated in
Subpart III.B above, this responsiveness not only stimulated economic
growth by creating incentives, but also enabled CCP to weather political
unrests time and again despite its political vulnerability, and helped it
maintain its political monopoly, a paramount order of the day.
However, the ever increasing complexity of the market economy
compels the CCP to further advance its legal reform. The more in-depth
the legal reform progresses, the greater the CCP risks losing its political
control over the economy. It is at this juncture that the regime's legitimacy
begins to morph from an ideological legitimacy to one that is based on
economic performance.
During the stage of metamorphosis, law remains more or less an
instrumentality. Central to the success of Posner's model illustrated above
is the so-called "rules-first strategy". In his view, China has followed this
approach by "introducing modern, commercially oriented rules of law at
the same time that it liberalized the economy."270 His observation is valid.
China has seemingly pursued and succeeded in striking a balance between
transplanting international legal institutions and maintaining the law's
indigenous roots, at least for the current phase of the property rights legal
reform.271 Resistance against the "wholesale transplantation" approach in
China's legal reform was born out of the CCP's imperative to maintain its
legitimacy. It was a desire shared by many jurists in China, perhaps largely
influenced by, and intended to defend, the party policy but nonetheless
genuine, to indigenize the legal reform. The incremental nature of the
property rights legislation proved that "the guiding principles for legal
reform are instrumentalism, utilitarianism and authoritarianism as
underlying philosophies in building a new legal system which regards
maintenance of political regime as being the main goal of legal reform. . . ."
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At the same time, it reflected a belief among jurists as represented by
Zhu Suli that "in China's pursuit of the rule of law, the key is not to copy
the Western legal system, but rather is to pay attention to the functioning,
through customs, of China's society." 273 He urges that "[f]ocus should be
directed towards social institutions that have been proven by experience to
be useful[,]" because "[o]therwise, the formal legal system could be
ignored and made irrelevant, possibly doing great harm to social order and
culture."274 This view is echoed by Daniel Bromley, who asserts that
"[h]istory plays a role here for the simple reason that any social
commitment is necessarily informed by prevailing ethical norms[, and]
within those prevailing social commitments, each generation brings its own
imperatives for continuity and change[.]"275
China's legal recognition and formalization of lesser real property
interests in property rights as codified by the Property Law gave rise to
disintegration and fragmentation of property rights. When "the singleowner presupposition is dropped," the difference between organizing an
economy according to capitalism or socialism becomes less plausible.276
As such, Thomas Grey notes, "capitalism and socialism become, not
mutually exclusive forms of social organization, but tendencies that can be
blended in various proportions," although "differences between profitoriented market exchange and political collective decision as methods of
organizing and operating enterprises remain." 277 The blending of both
socialism and capitalism elements of the economic order, coupled with a
Confucianized Communist ideology, might be at the core of what it means
to be "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics."
D. Is Privatization in Order?
The reaffirmation of state and public land ownership by the CCP in
its Property Law was more than a product of compromise resulting from
fierce political debates about ideology and redistribution of social wealth
accumulated through the reform era. It was a political stance taken by the
party-state. While the decentralization and recognition of the multiplicity
272
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of forms of property rights had proved to be highly effective in stimulating
China's economic growth, such institutional arrangements did little to
resolve pre-existing jurisprudential and technical conflicts in the area of
land ownership. Rather, it highlighted the role property rights play in
wealth distribution. As noted by Milton Friedman, "the final distribution of
income and wealth [] may well depend[] markedly on the rules of property
adopted."278 Consequently, "the privatization of ownership [] remains one
of the most explosive issues in Chinese society," particularly in rural
China.279
1.

Land Related Grievances

Decades of double-digit growth, booming development in urban
centers, and soaring government revenues would have been causes for
celebration for any other country, but ironically the CCP has much to worry
about. And property rights are at the root of the problem. Some have
predicated that China has two revolutions waiting to happen: "One is the
bourgeois revolution led by the emerging property-owning middle class
that the [Property Law] will help. The other is the potential for the
simmering resentment in the countryside to boil over, perhaps in frustration
at the law's shortcomings."280 This may not be a false alarm, considering
the fact that land related grievances have become the primary source for
social unrest in today's China.
a. Rural Areas
When Deng proclaimed "let some people get rich first" at the
outset of what was to become an unstoppable, jaw-dropping economic
transformation, it was anyone's guess whether he had foreseen the huge and
ever-growing income disparity between the rural populace and the city
dwellers. Despite China's impressive industrialization in recent decades, it
remains an agrarian nation, as two-thirds of its population are still
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farmers. 281 Most of China's 700 million plus rural population are left
behind by the economic reform. It is reported that the average urban-rural
income disparity had reached a record 3.34:1 in the first half of 2007.282
The Property Law did little to improve farmers' land use rights, as
it neither imposed new limitations on the governments' powers to
appropriate land—a rampant practice whereby local governments would
seize land for non-agricultural uses or for lucrative resale as the industrial
economy expands—nor allowed farmland mortgages.283 The constitution
mandates that collectives own the rural land without clearly defining who
the collectives are. Since the Property Law does not clarify the actual
ownership of the rural land, increasingly, local township and village heads
acted as the de facto owners and sold the land for industrial or commercial
purposes as urbanization invaded the countryside.284 Additionally, due to
the high demand and the resulting high prices of the urban land, city
residents have bought lands from farmers who, without prior authorization,
sold their lands to developers.285 As many as one out of five homes
purchased in Beijing is on unauthorized rural land.286 In January 2008, the
central government had to issue a directive to reiterate to the city residents
that they were banned from buying village properties.287 Since officials
from various levels of the local government often illegally seize and
reallocate farmers' land, farmers are discouraged from making long-term
investments or engaging in any meaningful land transactions. 288
Unsurprisingly, as Xiaolin Guo points out, land expropriation has
been primarily responsible for the "proliferation of rural conflicts" in
China in the past decade.289 Since the Property Law did little to stop the
practice, it persisted. Land expropriation is a form of "government
behavior (政府行为)" which is described as "using coercive measures to
acquire private land under compensatory arrangement by the government in
the public interest."290 It is a two-level "government behavior" under the
law. Even though the law provides that rural land is owned by the village
collectives, such collectives have the right to manage (经营) and supervise
(管理) the use of land, but they have no right to transfer land for
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compensatory use.291 The power to expropriate land is reserved for the
state, who "may, in accordance with the law, expropriate land which is
under collective ownership, if it is in the public interest."292 Under this
structure, land development involves a two-step process:
Land
expropriation (土地征用) by the government from villages, and land
transactions (土地出让) between the government and potential users.293
Only the second step requires that a transfer of the users' right be priced
according to market value.294 Guo observes that "land expropriation is, in a
sense, a procedure by which all rights formerly held by the village
collective are relinquished to the local government."295
His study reveals that the institutional relations between local
governments (county and township) and village collectives not only jointly
contributed to but also facilitated land expropriation.296 He observes that
the "bifurcation of the state perceived by the villagers[] wherein the central
state stands for justice and the local stands for injustice is significant to an
understanding of the complexity of state-peasant relations in China."297 He
attributes the "image of the bifurcated state" to "the increasingly predatory
behavior" of local state officials.298
Mao Zedong repeatedly warned his fellow party members about
how poverty gave rise to peasants' desire for change and how powerful
desire for change could in turn push them to revolution.299 Chinese farmers
have played an instrumental role in bringing the nation to prosperity. In
return, they have not only been unfairly neglected when it comes to wealth
distribution, but also have been asked to bear the brunt of the social costs
resulting from China's urbanization and industrialization. Though reasons
for their plight range far beyond land ownership alone,300 the land issue
remains at the core and has emerged as the key to finding a solution. The
regime simply cannot afford turning a blind eye to rural land grievances.
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Urban Areas

Since the late 1990s, China's urban landscape has undergone a
rapid transformation because of its sweeping housing privatization. 301
Pressured by the urban residents' desire to protect their newly acquired
assets, the CCP did much to please the emerging house-owning middle
class by making their properties more secure through the Property Law.302
However, the increasing dissatisfaction among urban dwellers caused by
grievances in the chai qian (拆迁) (demolition and relocation) process
remains a major concern of the party-state.
According to Michael Stanczyk, the decentralization of land
management and land use control led to vicious competition among local
governments to attract private real property investments in order to increase
their local revenues as well as grow the economic clout and political power
of their locality.303 This thirst for investment by local governments has
given rise to huge displacements of residential communities across
China. 304 As observed by You-tien Hsing, this process is further
complicated by the competition for control over land and, at times, a
necessary coalition between two dominant sets of statist players—the
territorial local governments and their leaders on the one hand, and the socalled "socialist land masters" on the other.305 The second set of players
come from China's centrally planned economy legacy, where central-level
government, party and military units, and SOEs that are physically located
within the jurisdiction of municipal governments formed a vertical
administrative bureaucratic structure known as tiao-kuai.306 Hsing finds, in
the struggle against the socialist land masters over control of premium
urban land, the municipal governments adopt numerous strategies to
consolidate and reinforce their power, which include setting up new
government agencies to rationalize land management, embarking on urban
redevelopment projects in the name of modernization, and establishing
institutions such as land banks in an attempt to monopolize urban land
supplies.307 The socialist land masters, on the other hand, capitalize on
transactions of urban land use rights by forming their own land
development companies and trading the use rights by negotiation, tender or
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open auction. 308 As the war for dominance over urban land proceeds
between these two sets of players, ordinary city residents are the ones who
lose out.
On a procedural level, the method of auctioning land use rights by
the local governments is often flawed, as the bidding process allows both
formal written rules and informal practice.309 Take Shanghai for instance.
Since its municipal government is not required to select the highest bidder,
the process is susceptible to favoritism and corruption.310 In fact, many
local governments tend to grant real estate developers "sweetheart" deals,
forming what can be viewed essentially as a loose partnership.311 Often,
when a collective or individual does not want to deal with a real estate
developer directly, the developer would "hire" the local government to take
the land for a "public use."312 Under the law, the local governments not
only have the power to define what a "public purpose" is, but also decide
the amount of compensation necessary for the taking. 313 As Stanczyk
observes, the cooperation between the real estate developers and the local
governments has caused mounting violations of zoning and building codes
by the developers and has turned inner-city redevelopment into a process of
"speculation, private deals and corruption."314
From a due process protection perspective, the current law lacks
necessary procedural requirements to protect the residents who are in the
midst of a demolition and relocation process. The law does not require
judicial review, and no injunction is available for those who object to a
taking.315 Although the issue of compensation may be litigated, practically
speaking, since local courts are subsidiaries of the government, little help is
available.316 As illustrated by the high-profile Chongqing "nail house" case
in March 2007, most disputes arise from what residents perceive as
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mistreatment by developers, which range from lack of adequate
compensation to a highly demoralizing and disrespectful process.317
For those reasons, demolition of homes for fast-paced urban
expansion and building development has become a highly contentious issue
and a leading cause for urban unrest.318 Since 2002, many large cities in
China have seen a sharp increase of the amount of litigation over unjust and
unlawful relocations as well as self-organized protests. 319 It is reported that
the number of protests by displaced citizens has been steadily increasing
and, in two extreme cases, people set themselves on fire in protest against
the government's demolition of their homes.320 To palliate widespread,
escalating social discontent, in January 2011, the State Council
promulgated the Rules for Expropriation and Compensation for Properties
on State-owned Land to replace a ten-year old set of rules governing the
expropriation of urban properties. The new Rules aim to offer a better
understanding of what may constitute "public interests" and the types of
compensations recoverable, in addition to providing stronger procedural
protections for the property owners.321
2. The Call for Privatization of Land Ownership
As evidenced by the intense political struggle and fierce debate
through the drafting process of the Property Law, the issue of whether
China should adopt a policy of outright privatization of land was a highly
sensitive political and ideological one. In the end, the drafters chose to
reaffirm the state and collective ownership of the land, despite prior,
popular speculations about a greater level of privatization. However, the
call for privatization of land ownership persisted.
Barely two months after the law was passed, about 1,000 farmers
gathered in the village meeting hall in Changchunling in Heilongjiang
Province and took back and redistributed the ownership of land originally
owned by the village collective to each family.322 Elsewhere in Fujin City,
where the village is located, more than 70 villages tried to privatize their
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land within a month.323 Through an internet statement issued in the name
of Fujin villages, they denounced collective land ownership as a means to
deprive the farmers of land ownership and declared, "[o]ur farmers' land
rights should include the right to use the land, the right to make income
from it, the right to inherit it and dispose of it and the right to negotiate
over it and set the price of it with developers."324 Within a few weeks, the
movement quickly spread to regions such as Jiangsu and Shaanxi
provinces, Tianjin city and as far as Chengdu in Sichuan.325 Although the
so-called "Fujin privatization movement" mainly grew out of farmers'
desperate frustration with illegal expropriation of farmland by corrupt local
officials and land developers, it was viewed by the government as a rural
revolt and was quickly put down.326
Chinese farmers are not alone in advocating for land privatization.
Legal and political analysts in China's academia have also urged rural land
privatization. Some believe it would be the final move toward China's
agricultural modernization.327 Others view it as a must for redressing the
economic disparity between China's booming cities and impoverished
countryside. 328 At the very least, there seems to be a consensus that
"[p]ublic ownership of land in the countryside has become a breeding
ground for corruption, waste and environmental degradation," which, if left
unsolved, will threaten social stability. 329
3. A Theoretical Outlook
In discussing how non-revolutionary institutional changes might
take place, North notes the following: "The agent of change is the
individual entrepreneur responding to the incentives embodied in the
institutional framework. The sources of change are changing relative
prices [which alter the incentives of individuals in human interaction] or
323
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preferences. The process of change is overwhelmingly an incremental
one."330 When relative price changes achieve "institutional equilibrium,"
then an institutional change will follow. "Institutional equilibrium" is
achieved when "given the bargaining strength of the players and the set of
contractual bargains that made up total economic exchange, none of the
players would find it advantageous to devote resources into [recontracting
within the framework of the existing rules]."331 When they are no longer
motivated to invest into the current arrangement, then a change is in order.
Applying this line of logic to China's landownership system, the question
becomes: Has China's current land ownership system achieved
"institutional equilibrium" where the economic actors are no longer
motivated to make further investment into the land?
A strong argument can be made that a further change in land
ownership is in order at least for rural land, as the urban land is believed to
have been de facto privatized due to the longer term of the use right and the
permitted transferability and mortgageability of such rights. In contrast,
farmers enjoy a shorter term of thirty years under the contracted land
management rights, and such rights cannot be mortgaged under the
Property Law. As a result, the farmers' incentive to make further
investments to the land has been severely reduced. The lack of investment
motivation is worsened by the rampant land seizures and illegal
expropriations by the corrupt local governments to make quick and
lucrative profits by converting land to commercial or industrial uses.
Unlike the booming urban real estate market, where credibility tends to be
more secure, the problematic collective ownership in the rural areas has
proven to be much less credible, which calls for an institutional change.
Similar to the "lack of credibility" argument advanced above, a
view has emerged among many that the next phase of China's reform will
require more drastic institutional changes as the going gets tough. Barry
Naughton views China's economic reform as having a two-phase
framework: The first phase occurred during the period from 1978 through
1993, and the second from 1993 to present.332 While, in his view, the
policy focus for the first phase was to shift power and resources from the
hands of central planners to local actors, the central agenda for the second
phrase is to build a firmer institutional basis for the market economy.333 He
argues that this policy shift would make China more closely resemble other
transitional economies in that the much touted polar opposition between
"big bang" and "gradualist" transitions may become less pronounced.334 He
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predicts that China will face political challenges during the second phrase
as it struggles to "develop a broader and sounder system of ownership, with
a stronger, and more transparent system of property rights[.]" 335
Naughton's view is shared by Peter Ho who believes that the institutional
ambiguity has served China well for the development stage of the reform,
however, further institutional reform in the land system must be carried out
to avoid grave consequences.336
4. A Practical Outlook
a. Pros and Cons of Rural Ownership Privatization
It is one thing to establish that rural land ownership needs to be
fixed, it is quite another to rush to the conclusion that outright privatization
is the cure. That said, many have engaged in heated, meaningful academic
debates about the pros and cons of privatization. Four of the most popular
arguments against rural land privatization, together with their counterarguments, are summarized below. Conspicuously missing from both sides
are two elephants in the room: ideological constraints and technical
difficulties involved in carrying out land privatization such as titling.
Nonetheless, these arguments offer a feasibility study of privatization for
current day rural China.
First, the policy of "land to the tiller" does not suit the current
economic conditions of China's market economy. The reasons are twofold.
Further fragmentation of rural land will reduce agricultural
productivity. In addition, the weakening bargaining power of an individual
farmer or the household will most likely result in land concentration in the
hands of a few due to market competition.337 They point to the failed
experiment of land privatization in the early 1950s and the subsequent
policy adjustment toward collectivism.338 Supporters of privatization have
dismissed this view as absurd, for it erroneously presumes that farmers will
either "squander" their land, or be less responsible toward their land than
the corrupt local government officials who have been acting as the de facto
owners of the rural land.339
335
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The second opposition is closely related to the first one. Holders of
this view believe that land privatization will give rise to rural landlessness
and large slums in cities. This group points to the adverse social
consequences that occurred in other formerly socialist countries, most
notably Russia, as a result of a hasty rural land privatization, and social
unrests due to landlessness existing in India and Brazil.340 In contrast, as
one scholar points out, the reason "why China has no real slums in spite of
its 200 million migrant workers" is that under the current land ownership,
everyone of them has a piece of land in their home village that they can
return to.341 Those who believe privatization is the right course of action
argue that the number of landless peasants in China reached 70 million as
of 2006 and is growing by 3 million each year.342
Third, privatizing rural land would lead to grain shortage and
would jeopardize China's long-term mandate to ensure food security.343
Two counter arguments are advanced to invalidate this view. First, the
food shortage concern might be an unrealistic, obsolete vestige of the Cold
War Era and, therefore, in the age of globalization, this concern is perhaps
unsound. And second, some have argued that, to impose the burden of
securing the nation's food supply on peasants alone is unfair, especially
considering the alternative arrangements under which they could convert
the land to capital.344 Admittedly, the grain shortage concern is a grave one
considering the recent exacerbation of the loss of China's much needed
arable land.
Lastly, some have argued that rural land privatization would delay
China's urban expansion, as it will increase the transaction costs to urbanize
farmland if ownership of the land is redistributed to individual farmers or
households.345 This view has been criticized as meritless because again it
advances urban interest to the detriment of China's rural population.346 On
the contrary, some believe that the increasing commodification of rural
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land resources, if unchecked by the state, will result in "a rapid
concentration of land in the hand[s] of a mighty few."347
b.

Preliminary Thoughts on What Changes are Needed

In a critique of adopting a utilitarian approach to evaluating
policies and institutions, Amartya Sen uses property rights as an
example.348 He warns against judging a particular arrangement of property
rights by their "constitutive features" alone; he believes the likely
consequences of a particular arrangement should also be taken into
consideration.349 To focus on the former alone will risk producing two
equally inadequate "purist approaches," i.e., no restrictions on property, on
the one hand, and abolition of private property on the other. Holders of the
first view "found it to be constitutive of individual independence and have
gone on to ask that no restriction be placed on the ownership, inheritance
and use of property, rejecting even the idea of taxing property or
income."350 Others, repelled by inequalities of ownership, "have gone on to
demand the abolition of private property." 351 A perhaps more useful
approach, Sen suggests, is to "examine the consequences of having-or not
having-property rights."352 He then discusses two arguments supporting
private property according to the consequentialist perspective. On the one
hand, private property has proved to be a "powerful engine of economic
expansion and general prosperity;" on the other hand, unconstrained use of
private property "can contribute to entrenched poverty and make it difficult
to have social support for those who fall behind for reasons beyond their
control." Further, "it can also be defective in ensuring environmental
preservation, and in the development of social infrastructure."353
Just as there does not exist a Blackstonian view of absolute
dominion over a thing, there is no pure sense of absolute private ownership.
As Sen cautions, the trick is to strike the right balance. Disallowing private
land ownership would risk harming efficiency and productivity; yet an

347

See Peter Ho & Max Spoor, Whose Land? The Political Economy of Land Titling in
Transitional Economies, 23 LAND USE POL'Y 583 (2006).
348
See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 60 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1999).
349
Id.
350
See Barry Bracewell-Milnes, Land and Heritage: The Public Interest in Personal
Ownership, HOBART PAPER 93 (The Institute of Economic Affairs 1982) (arguing that
"[l]and is not only a personal asset, being worth more to the owner than to strangers; it is
also proprietary wealth, being worth more to society when owned by private persons than
by the state or its agencies. . . [a]s both a personal asset and proprietary wealth, land is
particularly unsuitable for government interferences; in state hands property rights become
sterile."
351
See SEN, supra note 348, at 60–61.
352
Id. at 61.
353
Id.

2011]

WHATEVER-ISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS

99

unconstrained private land ownership might lead to worsened poverty and
greater social inequality. The defining feature of the current property rights
arrangement in China is privatization of use and management rights,354
rather than ownership rights.
Some call this approach de facto
privatization. It starts out as an innovative device for the party-state to hold
on to the imperative "public ownership" ideology, while creating economic
incentives. An unintended, positive consequence of this approach is that it
not only echoes the concept of dianquan existing in the traditional Chinese
land use system, but also coincides with the Hohfeldian view of placing
property rights in a web of relations and the tendency of disintegration and
fragmentation of property rights occurring elsewhere as identified by
Donahue.355 Perhaps the pluralist approach to property ownership goes far
beyond merely constraining private property rights. But considering
China's path dependence, not only its more recent Socialist legacy but also
its long-run collectivist tradition, the focus should be on how to make the
rural use and management rights more credible so as to motivate farmers'
investment, rather than an outright privatization of rural land.
Although voices calling for rural land ownership privatization
remain strong,356 the social cost of such a move outweighs its benefits. As
a tradeoff, the most pressing task, at the moment, is to make the use and
management rights more credible through institutional capacity-building
and to create more secure rights through both substantive and procedural
guarantees. Briefly stated, these include, inter alia, clarifying rural land
ownership rights to eliminate ambiguity, extending the length of contract
term for contracted management rights, allowing mortgageability of such
rights, and improving rural land registration. Essentially, this approach
would level the playing field between the urban dwellers and the rural
populace by according the later equally attractive rights without having to
confront the potentially massive social cost that an outright privatization of
rural land would trigger.
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DEMOCRACY WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: POLITICAL
RAMIFICATIONS OF THE INSTITUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

North believes, in equilibrium, "a given structure of property rights
[] will be consistent with a particular set of political rules [and] changes in
one will induce changes in the other."357 Through economic analysis, he
proves that the evolution of polities from single absolute rulers to
democratic governments is a move toward greater political efficiency.358
Conversely, "[o]ne gets efficient institutions by a polity that has built-in
incentives to create and enforce efficient property rights."359 Take England
for instance, he says, the built-in incentives include "[p]arliamentary
supremacy, [] curtailment of royal prerogative powers, independence of the
judiciary [], and the supremacy of the common law courts." 360
Milton Friedman echoes North's view, even though he puts it in a
slightly different way. He maintains that, between the two fundamental
ways of coordinating economic activities, i.e., "central direction involving
the use of coercion" and "voluntary co-operation of individuals," i.e., the
market place, the latter is more valued because it promotes both economic
and political freedom.361 He views economic freedom as not only an end in
itself but also an indispensable means toward the achievement of political
freedom. 362 However, mindful that economic freedom is a necessary
condition for political freedom, but not a sufficient condition, he warns that
it is "possible to have economic arrangements that are fundamentally
capitalist and political arrangements that are not free."363 Similarly, Joseph
Stiglitz finds that "[e]conomic growth and development do not
automatically confer personal freedom and civil rights."364 This view is
proved by a bleak picture recently painted by Jerome Cohen of a persistent
lack of political freedom and personal liberty in China despite its thriving
economic growth,365 a deficiency that earned Deng's reform the title "partial
reform."366
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The Great Debate about democracy and China has spawned a great
deal of literature that devotes to analyzing, speculating, and forecasting
China's political future, some more hopeful than others.367 It is certainly
tantalizing to join the debate, but to tackle such an all-encompassing
universe would have been overly ambitious for this paper. That said, the
indispensability of political institutions to property rights arrangements
makes it impossible to ignore political ramifications of China's de facto
privatization of property rights. Therefore, Part IV attempts to inquire into
China's political future by examining with brevity a much narrower issue,
i.e., how the de facto privatization of property rights will contribute to the
emerging rights consciousness among China's citizens, in both urban and
rural settings, and thereby furnish the bedrock for democracy to come in
China. To put it differently, will China's nascent recognition of private
property rights ultimately lead to China's political liberalization?
A. Rights Consciousness on the Rise
Those who are influenced by notable Western liberal thinkers such
as John Locke and Freidrich Hayek hope that China's recent privatization
effort will awaken a sense of individual autonomy and inalienable rights
among its people.368 Others dismiss this possibility by pointing to the
utilitarian and right-averse nature of recent Chinese legalization. Neil
Diamant et al., for instance, view Chinese law and legality as a conflict
management tactic and an outlet for expressing grievances. 369 They
believe, unlike its Western counterparts, the Chinese legalization program
is neither generated by liberal enlightenment nor by social negotiations
between the state and the rising bourgeoisie.370 Rather, it echoes a longstanding statist orientation which accorded the state a key, proactive role in
political, economic, and social development. 371 In this sense, law and
rights are essential to the regime because it contributes to a more orderly
society rather than to empowering the citizenry.372
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As a response to mounting grievances in both urban and rural
areas, China's legislature has shifted its focus toward social legislation. It
is reported that, in the NPC's effort to shift the focus from regulating
economic matters to resolving social issues, social legislation has increased
rapidly in recent years since the commencement of the 10th NPC in 2003,
and reached 20 percent at the NPC level and 40 percent at the provincial
and lower levels in the past five years, compared to a mere 4.7 percent
prior to 2003. 373 As Minxin Pei identifies, rapid economic and legal
development has created a more hospitable environment for individuals to
utilize the system, assert their rights and challenge the regime.374 Law and
legal system, as observed by Alford, have become a "double edged sword"
for the party-state:
the regime has not only through its law provided a legal,
moral, and political vocabulary with which those who wish
to take it to task might articulate their concerns, but also
has proffered these individuals a singular platform from
which their concerns might be broadcast. In seeking to
deploy formal legality for highly instrumental purposes,
the regime has unwittingly handed its opponents a keenly
honed instrument through which to seek to accomplish
their own, very different ends.375
Naturally, the process of utilizing the system has also increased
overall rights consciousness among ordinary people. According to a public
opinion survey conducted in as early as 1993, nearly 80 percent of the
respondents agreed with the statement that "[p]rivate property is sacred and
must not be violated," and two-thirds opposed the suggestion that the
"government may confiscate private property under any circumstances in
the national interest."376 Rights consciousness among China's citizens has
risen to a new level along with the sweeping privatization of urban housing
since the late 1990s and presumably more so with the passing of the
Property Law.
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1. Grassroots Urban Resistance Movement
As alluded to in Subpart III.D.1 above, urban home ownership has
given rise to one of the most contentious issues in China as the entire
nation is going through a urban renewal craze.
Disputes over
compensation, forced demolition and compulsory eviction to distant
suburbs abound in the demolition and relocation process. In addition,
wealthier owners of modern flats in new residential neighborhoods and
luxury homes in gated communities have organized homeowners'
associations to fight abuses by the developers and property management
companies.377 To protect their rights, homeowners have resorted to voting,
demonstration, protest, self-administration 378 against the intermediate
players such as developers, and collective civil resistance against the
government.379
For instance, in June 2007, residents living in shared facilities in
north-east Beijing, Jiuxianqiao, voted to accept an offer from a developer to
demolish their buildings.380 In the high-profile Chongqing "nail house"
case mentioned earlier, the property owners, unlike their neighbors, refused
to vacate their two-story brick building to give way to a major property
developer and stood firm as construction began around them.381 They
remained there even after a court deadline ordering them to allow
demolition had expired.382 The image of a lone brick building standing tall
amid the huge construction pit, with a banner reading: "The legal private
property of citizens cannot be violated," had spread all over the internet,
making the case a national cause célèbre.383 The lone "nail house" may
have invoked, in the minds of some people, the iconic image of the lone
protester who single-handedly halted the progress of military tanks on
Tian'anmen Square in 1989. The fact that the owners of the "nail house"
fought for protection of their private property rights as basic human rights
377
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and the moral support they received from the public and the Chinese media
bear testimony to the much heightened awareness of property rights among
the ordinary Chinese.
According to an investigation conducted by Luigi Tomba of the socalled weiquan ("protect your rights") movement in some of Beijing's gated
residential communities, the new spatial and organizational autonomy
brought about by the homeownership experience not only helped form a
new culture among the residents but also became a catalyst in the formation
of their collective identities.384 Even though conflicts and protests within
the group are reoriented toward intermediate players, such as local
institutions, developers and property managers, rather than toward the state
and its policies, their new identify and sub-culture increase their awareness
of rights and motivations to defend those rights and, as such, redefine their
relationship with the state. 385 According to Tomba, among the courtreported disputes, housing related disputes have experienced a 42 percent
increase from 1997 to 2000 nationwide.386
In their study of a collective resistance action directed at the
government sustained by homeowners in Shanghai, Fayong Shi and
Yongshun Cai find that, taking advantage of connections or social networks
of the action participants and exploiting the discrepant, and often
fragmented, interests of different levels of state authorities had helped
create opportunities for successful resistance by the homeowners.387 A
perhaps more interesting observation is that "the unique social networks
blur the boundary of the state and society, and make political participation,
or the way citizens exercise political influence, more subtle and perhaps
more effective.”388 Consequently, the efforts by the Chinese middle class
appear largely moderate due to “their intention to maintain the political
order and limited ability to stage disruptive action."389
2. Rural Resistance
As noted earlier, an even more urgent and threatening problem
confronts the regime in rural China. Chinese farmers are much more landbound than their urban cousins. Despite China's sweeping industrialization,
it remains an agrarian society. Not only have the farmers been left behind
by the economic reform but they also continue to be victimized by a
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perpetual policy bias favoring the city-dwellers. Their plight is exacerbated
by the ill-defined rural collective land ownership, which has fueled land
seizures by corrupt local government officials for illegal personal gains and
local revenues. As highlighted by the "Fujin privatization movement"
discussed in Part III.D.2 above, today's farmers are better equipped with
communication and organizational skills, making them more threatening to
the regime.
According to Cai, local governments' reluctance to pay reasonable
compensation for farmers who lost farmland is a major source of rural
conflicts today.390 Among the mass confrontations between farmers and the
police in 2004 that he analyzed, about 67 percent were land-use related;
and among the land related confrontations, 55 percent occurred because
farmers tried to prevent construction on land that had been taken away
from them.391 The nature of the confrontations could be quite violent,
involving fatalities of farmers, due to the high stakes the farmers had in the
land and because often times collective resistance such as confrontation
was their last resort after their peaceful petitions failed.392 Since the central
government rarely intervenes unless it feels the pressure of protecting
stability or regime legitimacy, few protests receive media coverage and
most were suppressed by the local governments.393
3. Emergence of Civil Society
The reconfiguration of Chinese society as a result of economic
freedom has led to a diversity of interests that, in some instances, give rise
to the freedom of association. According to Bruce Gilley, there were
135,000 officially registered "social groups" in China by the end of 2002,
among which more than half were sub-national level groups, representing
groups as diverse as women, environmental causes, new religions, and
charities, in addition to homeowners.394 Gilley observes, despite fantasies
of an orientalist bonding between state and society, all evidence shows that
civil society in China is developing in opposition to state power, which
some in the leadership see as potentially posing a serious threat to political
stability and unity. 395 Many believe that the gradual creation and
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development of a civil society is "creating favorable conditions for China's
future democracy."396
4. State-Sponsored Village Election
To quench rural conflicts preemptively, the central government has
initiated numerous state-sponsored reform measures on both village and
township levels, ranging from village election, village assemblies, and the
cadre responsibility and evaluation system, with mixed success. 397 As
Elizabeth Perry and Merle Goldman observe, even though such measures
are state-sponsored, they are reconfiguring local politics in surprising and
significant ways.398
So far the most successful state-sponsored reform mechanism
remains village elections, which reportedly have been conducted in over 80
percent of China's villages.399 The Organic Law of Village Committees
was passed in 1987 to give villagers the opportunity to elect village
officials and establish a number of democratic institutions for village
governance, and to permit villagers to monitor local cadres and allow
villagers to elect a leader and a village committee.400
Despite the active participation by villagers across China, some
have cast serious doubt on village election as a mode of grassroots selfgovernment. They view China's village elections as a measure to improve
local governance in order to buttress regime stability, and warn of the
danger that China's current grassroots political reforms might help forestall
rather than facilitate the advance of formal democracy at the national
level. 401 Perry and Goldman argue that "[d]eferring progress toward
national political reform in favor of dealing with the immediate challenge
of curbing corrupt local cadres may be viewed as an acceptable tradeoff by
ordinary Chinese citizens, for whom abusive and rapacious local officials
pose the more urgent and immediate concern." 402 They do acknowledge
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that, despite their top-down nature, whether these reforms are working to
empower or imperil the party-state remains unclear.403
B.

Counterforces at Work

The responsiveness demonstrated by the CCP in the economic
sphere is part and parcel of its perennial struggle for legitimacy.
Weatherley observes that, throughout the history of the PRC, the CCP has
utilized traditional legitimacy, which lies somewhere in between
charismatic legitimacy and legal rational legitimacy, ideology legitimacy in
the Mao era, and performance based legitimacy during the Deng era, i.e., a
combination of economic legitimacy and legal rational legitimacy.404 The
Tian'anmen student movement has taught the regime that economic
legitimacy alone would not suffice. In fact, Samuel Huntington's warnings
seem to ring true that, "[r]eform can be a catalyst for revolution rather than
a substitute for it” and that “[t]he very fact that a regime makes reforms and
grants concessions encourages demands for still more changes which can
easily snowball into a revolutionary movement."405 The collapse of the
former Soviet Union and its swift dismemberment caused by its bold
political reforms still loom large as a negative example in the minds of
Chinese leaders.406 Meanwhile, the regime is increasingly aware of the
mutual reinforcement between economic reform and political liberalization
as well as the inevitability of political reform. While preemptively
experimenting with state-sponsored reform measures, such as village
elections, the CCP looked elsewhere and found social stability as a means
of legitimacy,407 as reflected by the main thrust of Hu Jintao's signature
ideology, "harmonious society."
As China emerges from its isolated past onto the international
stage, the CCP has increasingly sought to identity itself as "a nationalist
force, transforming China into an economic superpower and standing firm
against attempts by foreign governments to undermine its process." 408
Historically, Chinese nationalism has inspired pro-democracy movements,
such as the May Fourth enlightenment movement of 1919, against
tyrannical rulers.409 In present day China, along with the emergence of a
property-owning middle class, the desire of its citizens to build a cultural
and national identify that is uniquely Chinese is ever so strong. As Yingjie
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Guo describes, this identity is said to be "a new culture, a new mode of
knowledge, a new socio-political and cultural-moral system, 'a framework
of universal values, which contains the best of East and West, past and
present', and a 'Chinese' alternative to modernity."410
However, the CCP has mastered the art of invoking and buttressing
nationalism at appropriate times to reinforce its legitimacy. Deng himself
invoked the name of the "Yellow Emperor" upon signing the agreement
with Britain over the return of Hong Kong.411 The political elites in China
increasingly realize the role of what Joseph Nye called "soft power" in
international politics. A key political adviser to Jiang Zemin notes that the
"power shift" taking place in international politics from the "reliance on
violence and wealth" to "a knowledge-based power structure" and that
control over knowledge will become the focal point in future global power
politics.412 He advocates that China ought to maintain its own position and
orientation, come up with strategies to enhance its "soft power," legitimize
its power, and make its culture attractive to others.413
As demonstrated by the events surrounding the global protests
against the Chinese policy toward Tibet and China's Olympic torch relay
around the globe in 2008 and the subsequent anti-West protests by young
nationalist Chinese students both within and beyond China, a distinct
possibility exists where the CCP hijacks its citizens’ fervent nationalism
and turns it into a unifying force between itself and the emerging middle
class, thereby thwarting the process of political liberalization. However, it
may turn out to be a "double-edged sword." One can never underestimate
the critical importance of mass mobilization in China. The CCP is acutely
aware of the irony as well as the danger of mishandling nationalist
sentiment as it may turn its back and challenge rather than boost the
regime's legitimacy.414
V.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The collective ownership and control of real property in China was
established in 1949 when the CCP took control. More than half a century
later, the rapid economic transformation taking place within China has
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resulted in the reemergence of private property rights and decollectivization of rural lands. The question of "who owns what" has never
been so vital and pressing. To recognize the fruits of economic reform and
to reinforce its performance-based legitimacy, the party-state codified its de
facto privatization of real property rights, particularly in urban centers, to
signal its determination to carry forward China's thriving market economy.
Coming out of a self-imposed isolation three decades ago, China was soon
greeted by industrialization, urbanization, and privatization. They came
roughly in that order, but all three are here to stay. Un-disoriented and
unfazed, the party-state steadfastly plods down the path charted by the
"architect" of its reform policy - a path called "Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics."
Just like Wesley Hohfeld's groundbreaking analysis of "rights"
renders it possible for us to define "liberty" (an absence both of a duty and
of a right), 415 I hope an examination of "Socialism with Chinese
characteristics" through China's real property rights as an institution would
enable us to pause and gain a new perspective on what it means to be
uniquely Chinese in both economic and political spheres, free from the
ideological pre-conceptions the party-state envisaged. Compelled by
political survival and guided by unwavering pragmatism, the party-state
has loosened its tight grip over its people to unleash the largest workforce
the world had yet to see. The co-existence and entanglement of public and
private, collective and individual, "us" and "self" have reconfigured the
contemporary Chinese social fabric. But however much has changed, one
thing remains the same: The constant negotiation between the ruler and its
constituents.
Economically, through negotiation, the pendulum swings between
decentralization/privatization and collectivization. When the behavior of
political and economic actors becomes self-enforcing, it creates credible
commitment for its economy to steadily grow. The great divide between
town and country exposes serious defects in China's property law regime.
More credible and secure land tenure is necessary not only to motivate the
performance but also to build the capacity of the Chinese peasantry.
Politically, through negotiation, the pendulum swings between the
tendency to converge and the tendency to diverge between the ruler and its
constituents. Privatization of property rights has awaken a sense of "self,"
and thus autonomy, among the constituents.
As is increasingly clear, more thorough marketization of the
economy erodes the party-state's control over the economy. Along with
more economic freedom, the beneficiaries of the economic reform demand
for more secure protection of their wealth, while those who are left behind
call for equal opportunity to participate in profits. With widely available
415
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modern technology at their disposal, Chinese citizens across the nation are
capable of organizing themselves at unprecedented speed. As Mao
famously heeded: "A single spark can start a prairie fire." Decentralization
and divergent interests cause fragmentation between the central and local
governments as well as among different regions. The enhanced rights
consciousness among the citizens, coupled with the power fragmentation
within the government, is a force to be reckoned with. It is not a question
of whether, but a question of when and how, this force will be put to use to
fragment the party-state's political monopoly.
If liberty is indeed the absence of both a "duty" and of a "right,"
then liberalization is the process it takes to reach that state, a state perhaps
we can call freedom. Freedom is achievable if we begin with a better
delineation of "rights." Similarly, if property rights in China are
"rectified," to borrow from Confucius, China should be on its way to
attaining the state called freedom.

